高階經理人薪酬、公司治理與經營績效 : 以台灣金融業為例

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Title:	高階經理人薪酬、公司治理與經營績效 : 以台灣金融業為例
Other Titles:	Executive compensation, corporate governance, and firm performance : an empirical study of financial firms in Taiwan
Authors:	楊怡雯;Yang, Yi-Wen
Contributors:	淡江大學保險學系保險經營碩士班湯惠雯
Keywords:	公司治理;董事會;家族控制;高階經理人薪酬;經營績效;兩階段最小平方法;corporate governance;Board of Director;Family Control;Executive Compensation;Operating Performance;Two-Stage Least Squares
Date:	2014
Issue Date:	2015-05-04 09:47:12 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本研究探討2005年至2012年間台灣公開發行以上金融業之高階經理人薪酬對公司經營績效的影響，以及公司績效對高階經理人薪酬的影響。本研究亦檢視公司治理機制對高階經理人薪酬及公司績效是否扮演成功的制衡角色。由於高階經理人薪酬與公司經營績效間可能存在因果關係，本研究除使用普通最小平方法(ordinary least square method, OLS)進行迴歸方程式之參數估計外，另建置聯立方程模型，採用兩階段最小平方法(two-stage least squares method, 2SLS)檢測兩者的關係，以期獲得一致性的估計，降低估計過程中所產生之偏誤。本研究實證結果發現，我國金融業之高階經理人薪酬與公司經營績效彼此間，具有正向之相互影響；較大規模的董事會具有較佳的監督效果，有助於公司績效的提升，而董監持股及經理人持股的增加，則與經營績效無關。雖然家族控制對公司績效並無顯著的影響，然而，受到家族控制的公司卻有顯著較高的高階經理人薪酬。此外，當管理者持股愈低，董事會很可能給付較高的薪酬作為激勵，以使其利益與公司之利益相結合。因此，本研究結果為高階經理人薪酬與公司經營績效之相關研究提供了新證據。 We investigate the impact of executive compensation on firm performance and examine whether the changes in firm performance affect executive compensation using publicly financial firms in Taiwan from 2005 to 2012. We also pay attention to whether corporate governance mechanisms play a successful role on monitoring executive compensation and firm performance. Due to a possibly causal relationship between executive compensation and firm performance, we establish simultaneous equation models estimated by a two-stage least squares method (2SLS) in addition to an ordinary least square method (OLS), hoping to get a consistent estimation and reduced biases. Our empirical results show that executive compensation and firm performance of Taiwanese financial firms have a positive relationship with each other. Larger boards have better oversight and improve firm performance, while board shareholdings and managers’ ownership present no significant influence on firm performance. Although family-controlled firms have no significantly increased firm performance, these firms have higher executive compensation than those of non-family controlled firms. In addition, when managerial ownership is lower, the board is likely to pay higher compensation as an incentive to align managers’ interests with the firm’s interests. Accordingly, the results of the study provide new evidence for the research on executive compensation and firm performance.
Appears in Collections:	[Graduate Institute & Department of Insurance Insurance] Thesis

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