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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/102071

    Title: 壽險業短劣質件影響因素與核保準則之研究
    Other Titles: A study of determinants of inferior contracts and underwriting policy in the life insurance industry
    Authors: 林聖益;Lin, Sheng -Yi
    Contributors: 淡江大學保險學系保險經營碩士在職專班
    何佳玲;Ho, Chia-Ling
    Keywords: 核保;短劣質件;資訊不對稱;逆選擇;Underwriting;inferior contract;information asymmetry;Anti-selection
    Date: 2014
    Issue Date: 2015-05-04 09:46:38 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 資訊不對稱的問題一直存在於保險市場上,一方擁有的資訊明顯與另一方擁有的資訊在質和量上都有很大的不同。保險經營,應注意於良好適當之危險選擇,以防止逆選擇與道德危險之影響,進而謀求訂立大量良質的保險契約。
    Information asymmetry has long been an important issue in the insurance market. The quality and quantity of information vary significantly from one party (policyholder) to another (insurer). This issue presents the need for insurance companies to ensure appropriate hazard selection so as to avoid anti-selection and moral hazards in seeking a large number of quality insurance contracts.
    This paper samples new contracts signed by sales personnel of the selected life insurance company, and the sample pool includes inferior contracts. Regressions are performed for the empirical analysis of the significant factors that influence inferior contracts. Research findings are expected to serve as reference to the case study company as it initiates hazard control of underwriting principles to enhance the quality of new contracts and increase mortality gains.
    The empirical study indicates a significant and positive correlation between physical examinations and inferior contracts. Specifically, the presence of physical examinations leads to a higher probability of inferior contracts. On the contrary, a significant but negative correlation exists between phone interviews and inferior contracts. Phone interviews can reduce the probability of inferior contracts. A significant and negative correlation is also observed between survival investigations and inferior contracts. Hence, survival investigations can avoid inappropriate policies and reduce the likelihood of inferior contracts.
    In order to avoid the occurrence of inferior contracts as a result of anti-selection and moral hazards, this paper suggests that the policies requiring physical examinations should include more robust reviewing procedures. Life insurance companies should also improve phone interviews and survival investigation processes to help them achieve better contract quality and business stability.
    Appears in Collections:[保險學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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