資訊不對稱的問題一直存在於保險市場上，一方擁有的資訊明顯與另一方擁有的資訊在質和量上都有很大的不同。保險經營，應注意於良好適當之危險選擇，以防止逆選擇與道德危險之影響，進而謀求訂立大量良質的保險契約。 本文係以個案壽險公司業務員招攬之新契約件，其中包含短劣質件為研究樣本，透過迴歸分析進行實證研究，探討影響短劣質件保險契約之顯著因素，進而提出改善建議，冀祈作為該個案公司核保準則中危險選擇控管之參考，以提升新契約良質率，提高死差益。 實證結果顯示，體檢件與短劣質件呈現顯著正相關，當新契約件經體檢後承保相較於無體檢件，其後發生短劣質件之機率會提高。電訪件與短劣質件呈現顯著負相關，即經過電訪作業後之新契約承保件，可以降低新契約中的短劣質件機率。此外，生存調查件與短劣質件部份呈現顯著負相關，對於經生存調查之新契約承保件，可以明顯避免不適當投保，減少引進不良契約。 為避免逆選擇與道德危險所致引發短劣質件之發生，本文建議對於體檢件應採用為更為嚴謹之核保作業相關規範、提高電訪作業、並增加生存調查作業的方式，將可使契約品質獲得改善，以確保壽險公司經營安全。 Information asymmetry has long been an important issue in the insurance market. The quality and quantity of information vary significantly from one party (policyholder) to another (insurer). This issue presents the need for insurance companies to ensure appropriate hazard selection so as to avoid anti-selection and moral hazards in seeking a large number of quality insurance contracts. This paper samples new contracts signed by sales personnel of the selected life insurance company, and the sample pool includes inferior contracts. Regressions are performed for the empirical analysis of the significant factors that influence inferior contracts. Research findings are expected to serve as reference to the case study company as it initiates hazard control of underwriting principles to enhance the quality of new contracts and increase mortality gains. The empirical study indicates a significant and positive correlation between physical examinations and inferior contracts. Specifically, the presence of physical examinations leads to a higher probability of inferior contracts. On the contrary, a significant but negative correlation exists between phone interviews and inferior contracts. Phone interviews can reduce the probability of inferior contracts. A significant and negative correlation is also observed between survival investigations and inferior contracts. Hence, survival investigations can avoid inappropriate policies and reduce the likelihood of inferior contracts. In order to avoid the occurrence of inferior contracts as a result of anti-selection and moral hazards, this paper suggests that the policies requiring physical examinations should include more robust reviewing procedures. Life insurance companies should also improve phone interviews and survival investigation processes to help them achieve better contract quality and business stability.
