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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/101964

    Title: 產品品質外生下的政府最適政策探討
    Other Titles: The study of government optimal policy with exogenous product quality
    Authors: 林玠宇;Lin, Chieh-Yu
    Contributors: 淡江大學產業經濟學系碩士班
    陳宜亨;Chen, Yi-Heng
    Keywords: 貿易政策;產品品質;trade policy;product quality
    Date: 2014
    Issue Date: 2015-05-04 09:44:07 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本論文建立一個兩國兩廠商的模型,進口國存在生產高品質的廠商,出口國則是生產低品質的廠商。本文探討兩國廠商在高品質國家做Cournot競爭或相互合作的情況下,兩國政府選擇政策時間點對廠商利潤和社會福利的影響,而為使自身國內的社會福利最大,政府的政策究竟是會實施補貼或課稅政策?
    This paper sets up a trade model with two countries in the world market. Each country has a monopolistic firm. They produce quality-different product. Assume that the product produced by the firm in the import country has higher quality than the product produced in the export country. We explore the impact of the timing of government’s policy making on two firms’ profits and two countries’ social welfare under two firms doing Cournot competition and collusion. Also, to maximize social welfare, the government should apply subsidy or tax on their domestic firm?
    Using two stage game, after the government decides the policy, the firms do Cournot competition or collusion in the market of import country. The timing of the government policy-making can be expressed by Stackelberg’s leader-follower model and Cournot conjectural variation assumption.
    This article finds that when firms are doing Cournot competition, the import country with high quality product behaves as a follower would be the best outcome for either profits of two firms or social welfare of two countries. However, when the firms colluding with each other, both firms would like to have a second mover government to have more profit, but both government would like to be a first mover to maximize its own country’s social welfare.
    Appears in Collections:[產業經濟學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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