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    Title: 產品品質外生下的政府最適政策探討
    Other Titles: The study of government optimal policy with exogenous product quality
    Authors: 林玠宇;Lin, Chieh-Yu
    Contributors: 淡江大學產業經濟學系碩士班
    陳宜亨;Chen, Yi-Heng
    Keywords: 貿易政策;產品品質;trade policy;product quality
    Date: 2014
    Issue Date: 2015-05-04 09:44:07 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本論文建立一個兩國兩廠商的模型,進口國存在生產高品質的廠商,出口國則是生產低品質的廠商。本文探討兩國廠商在高品質國家做Cournot競爭或相互合作的情況下,兩國政府選擇政策時間點對廠商利潤和社會福利的影響,而為使自身國內的社會福利最大,政府的政策究竟是會實施補貼或課稅政策?
    利用二階段賽局,令政府決定完政策後,廠商再做Cournot競爭或相互合作。政府政策時間點的表現,採用同時決定政策或是Stckelberg的模型。
    本文發現,當廠商進行Cournot數量競爭時,生產高品質產品的進口國政府後決定政策,對高品質的進口國及低品質的出口國,不管是廠商的利潤或是兩國的社會福利都是最好的。當廠商相互合作時,以廠商利潤來看,兩國廠商皆會偏好自己國家政府後做政策決定為最好。以國家社會福利來看,生產高品質的進口國先做決定對兩國的社會福利都是最好的。
    This paper sets up a trade model with two countries in the world market. Each country has a monopolistic firm. They produce quality-different product. Assume that the product produced by the firm in the import country has higher quality than the product produced in the export country. We explore the impact of the timing of government’s policy making on two firms’ profits and two countries’ social welfare under two firms doing Cournot competition and collusion. Also, to maximize social welfare, the government should apply subsidy or tax on their domestic firm?
    Using two stage game, after the government decides the policy, the firms do Cournot competition or collusion in the market of import country. The timing of the government policy-making can be expressed by Stackelberg’s leader-follower model and Cournot conjectural variation assumption.
    This article finds that when firms are doing Cournot competition, the import country with high quality product behaves as a follower would be the best outcome for either profits of two firms or social welfare of two countries. However, when the firms colluding with each other, both firms would like to have a second mover government to have more profit, but both government would like to be a first mover to maximize its own country’s social welfare.
    Appears in Collections:[產業經濟學系暨研究所] 學位論文

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