|摘要: ||本論文透過美國倡議成立國際貨幣基金組織的探討，來了解美國戰後金融外交政策的思維與決策脈絡、探究美國國際金融政策的主導部門如何轉換、分析羅斯福總統的領導與決策風格。本研究以艾里遜(Graham T. Allison)之決策理論，設立模式假設，以美國倡導成立國際貨幣基金的決策過程為案例，來驗證理論假設。同時，本論文亦檢視艾里遜決策理論，在解釋本案例上是否有不足之處，並且輔之以其他決策模式，以求對本案例可以有完整透徹之了解。 |
The purpose of this dissertation is trying to understand Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) Administration’s postwar international financial policy to initiate International Monetary Fund. This dissertation, with official declassified archives, attempts to give a whole and deep analysis to the case “The U.S.’s Decision-Making Process of Initiating International Monetary Fund” with Graham T. Allison’s Decision-Making Theory and Models. Meanwhile, this dissertation also examined the deficiencies of Allison’s theory on interpreting general cases of the foreign policy decisions, and supplemented it with Presidential Decision-Making Theory to have a complete and thorough understanding of this case.
According to Under Allison’s Decision-Making Theory and Models, this dissertation presented three assumptions: (A) In the Model of Rational Actor, this study set up the hypothesis H1－While the alternative which matches the national interest and objects best and has the feasibility, it will more likely be accepted as the national policy. (B) In the Model of Organizational Behavior, this study set up the hypothesis H2－When an organization with clear and practical stances, with professional and open culture, and with good Stand Operation Processes (SOPs), its policy will more likely be accepted. (C) In the Model of Government Politics, this study sets up the hypothesis H3－While a participant can handle the bargaining advantages best and has close relationship with the President, his policy will more likely be accepted. Moreover, this study adopted the presidential decision-making theory to supplement the insufficiency of Allison’s theory in this case and proposed a fourth hypothesis H4－If the President encourages the open expressions of different views and establishes the diverse communication channels with the President, the President himself will become the key figure in policy formation.
In aspects of rational actor model, the study found that: First, the Roosevelt administration''s postwar international monetary policy objectives are: (1) to avoid the collapse of postwar monetary and credit system repeating the mistakes of World War I; (2) to ensure the U.S. trade amount in the world; (3) to restore the confidence and economic development of the U.S. and the world after the World War II (WWII). Second, in accordance with its objectives, the Roosevelt administration had the following alternatives: (1) the free-trade programs proposed by U.S. State Department, (2) the international clearing organization plan proposed by John Maynard Keynes from United Kingdom, (3) the IMF (International Monetary Fund) plan proposed by U.S. Treasury. Third, the United States chose the IMF plan, according to the following several reasons: (1) United States had understood and showed their national strength to promote their own favorable plan. (2) The UK scheme was not in U.S. interests. The Keynes''s main concerns were the interests and the financial position of United Kingdom. (3) The IMF plan had the practicality of multilateral organizations, which was acceptable for Britain and in line with U.S. interests.
In aspects of organizational behavior model, this study found that: First, in the organizational objectives, the free-trade policies advocated by State Department did not consider the international reality, while Treasury actually had clear policy objectives which took into account the realities of international diplomacy. Second, in the organizational culture, the State Department, with conservative attitude, lacked the financial professionals; the Treasury was not only professional with financial issues, but also had a positive attitude towards the New Deal. Third, in the operating procedures, State Department varied the overlapping responsibilities, and the officials were lack of full authorization; the Treasury organization had a unified authorization, and its information channels were open and sufficient. Thus, the IMF policy of Treasury was finally adopted as a national policy.
In aspects of governmental politics model, this study found: First, in the position of the participants, in the WWII President Roosevelt adopted international cooperation in order to maintain the employment in the United States and the overseas markets; Secretary of State Cordell Hull maintained his idea of free trade and opposed any trade restrictions and controls; Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. and his assistant Harry Dexter White had Roosevelt''s shadow in many aspects to protect the U.S. dollars and strength which had acquired a lot of gold reserves since 1934. The external opposition forces mainly came from some Republican members of Congress advocating isolationism, as well as part of the bank groups who advocated the reducing of government intervention in international financial markets. Second, the determinants of decision-making outcomes for participants are: (1) Roosevelt liked the competitive administrative style, remaining the final decision in the hands of the president; (2) Hull only had ideas, but could not handle Roosevelt’s leadership style; (3) Morgenthau could master the action channels and the bargaining advantages, and made the practical and effective policies. (3)The Government vigorously promoted its policies to convince people, having the external forces suppressed.
Since Roosevelt was one of the most influential modern presidents and Allison''s bureaucratic politics model overlooked the key status of presidential decisions in foreign policy making, this study adopted presidential decision-making theory to supplement the insufficiency of Allison’s theory. In the presidential decision-making model, this study found that: (1) In terms of personality, President Roosevelt belongs to a positive-active type president, with a strong sense of political efficacy, to make his choice from the programs he wanted. (2) In the perspective of international financial policy, President Roosevelt took the maintaining of U.S. domestic economic development as his primary consideration. Before World War II, he refused the international financial cooperation, and hoped the development of unrestricted dollars to favor the U.S. economic recovery from the Great Depression; however, in wartime and postwar, he advocated the international cooperation to sustain the U.S. economy. (3) In terms of leadership style, President Roosevelt liked the competitive administrative style that allows the competitions among the relevant decision-making bureaucracy, and he became the final arbiter to choose the policy that best met his ideas and interests.
On the theoretical verification of this case, the last two hypotheses on Allison’s models (H2, H3) had got a full verification, confirming and strengthening the Allison’s theory of General. However, on the verification of hypothesis H1, The study found that the U.S. government’s selection of the IMF plan not entirely met the best interests of the United States, even although it was in line with the U.S.’s postwar monetary policy objectives and national interests. U.S. still considered the special relationship between U.S. and Britain, and the world international situations, and not completely destroyed the Britain’s Imperial Preference. This is not totally consistent with the hypothesis H1. Moreover, hypothesis H4 on the presidential decision-making theory had got a full verification. However, this result also proved that Allison’s theory does have the insufficiency in this case, and the need to complement the presidential decision-making model in order to have a complete explanation of this case.
The main theme of this dissertation could be concluded as: FDR encouraged the competitions and the conflicts among the participants and the organizations to provide the alternatives of U.S. postwar international financial policy to compete with the Britain’s proposal, utilized the U.S. national interest, and also gave the consideration to the postwar international situation.