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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw:8080/dspace/handle/987654321/101691

    Title: The decision-making process of U.S. foreign policy toward two Taiwan strait crises in the 1950s
    Other Titles: 一九五零年代美國對兩次台海危機的決策過程研究
    Authors: 張簡乃文;Chang Chien, Nai-Wen
    Contributors: 淡江大學美洲研究所碩士班
    Keywords: 艾里遜決策理論;艾森豪政府;台海危機;決策過程;Rational Actor Model (RAM);the Organizational Behavior Model (OBM);Governmental Politics Model (GPM)
    Date: 2014
    Issue Date: 2015-05-04 09:15:27 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本論文以艾里遜 (Graham T. Allison) 決策理論之「理性行為者模式、組織行為模式、政府政治模式」為主要分析架構,以兩次台海危機為案例研究,來檢視艾森豪政府在危機期間的決策過程,並以此過程研究之分析及討論,提出三個假設,以檢視該理論之適用性。除此之外,筆者也將比較分析法納入此研究,冀望賦予此論文更完整全面性的分析。


    The paper laid the foundation on Graham T. Allison’s three decision-making models-the Rational Actor Model (RAM), the Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and the Governmental Politics Model (GPM) as the theoretical structure to explore the formulation of U.S. foreign policy during the two Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s. In order to make the analysis more comprehensive, I also adopted the comparative analysis method to present the evolution of the decision-making process of the two Crises. By doing so, I established three hypotheses from the theory and applied them in the two case studies to verify application of the theory.
    When these offshore islands were under heavy attack in the first Strait Crisis, whether or not the U.S. should defend these offshore islands for Taiwan was “ a horrible dilemma” to the Eisenhower administration and put the U.S. in a difficult situation to deal with due to its extensive political implications. On the one hand, the U.S. was unwilling to run the risk of waging war with Communist China or even Soviet Union. On the other hand, it did not want to lose its prestige because of staying out of the Strait conflict. Considering all the courses of actions, the U.S. attempted to resolve the Crisis by passing the dilemma to the U.N, signing the Sino-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty and concluding the Formosa Resolution with Taiwan in exchange for ROC’s acceptance of the U.N. arrangement and withdrawal from Tachens. When the second Crisis occurred in 1958, with nearly one third of ROC troops stationed on the islands, the dilemma therefore was not to intervene or not but how to intervene to suit U.S. best interest. The Eisenhower administration decided to provide escort operation for safety landing of ROC’s supplies.
    Although the Eisenhower administration did not take military actions in the event of both Strait Crises, utilization of nuclear weapons as well as military actions were widely discussed and prepared. Various organizations had tried to have their proposals of military actions adopted by President Eisenhower so that they could stand out their organizational values. In particular, the employment of nuclear weapons was seriously considered under the ”Massive Retaliation Strategy.” While in the 1958 Crisis, the posture of Eisenhower administration toward utilization of atomic weapons became relatively conservative in light of the Soviets progress of its nuclear weapons. The overall policy of Eisenhower administration did undergo some changes; nevertheless, the adjustments all served U.S. best interests.
    Appears in Collections:[美洲研究所] 學位論文

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