| Abstract: | 1960年代可說是美國對中國政策逐漸轉變的開端，在甘迺迪及詹森兩任政府期間，美國的中國政策似乎已不如過去杜魯門及艾森豪政府般的不可撼動。不論是當時中國民國政府「反攻大陸」政策，以及聯合國「中國代表權」的兩大重要議題，都隱約透露出美國的中國政策已逐漸開始面臨轉變。因此，本論文之主要研究目的係探討詹森時期美國因應中國問題的決策過程。
本論文試圖以艾里遜之決策理論，亦即「理性決策模式、組織決策模式、政府政治模式」，作為主要分析架構，針對詹森時期因應中華民國反攻大陸、中共核武試爆，以及聯合國中國代表權等重要案例進行分析，並且提出相關假設進行驗證。
首先，詹森政府因應國府反攻大陸可說是延續甘迺迪時期模糊拖延之作為，然而在詹森理性抉擇之下，為避免因支持國府而導致與蘇聯發生衝突，詹森明確拒絕支援國府反攻大陸的行為。當時各部會對國府反攻大陸之評估，亦認為支持國府可能使美國捲入戰爭，對美國國家利益形成嚴重威脅。在官員互動過程中，國務卿魯斯克的反對立場，更加強了詹森拒絕支援國府的決定。
其次，在因應中共核武試爆時，詹森在使用軍事手段或外交手段作為因應之間，選擇透過外交手段作為回應。事實上，當時詹森政府內部亦出現兩派不同意見，分別是動用軍事手段與採取外交手段，然而，由於當時中央情報局未能掌握更多正確情資，加上國務院的評估漸獲支持並形成主流意見的情況下，使詹森接受魯斯克為主的國務院看法，決定透過採取外交手段作為回應。
最後，詹森政府在因應聯合國中國代表權問題時，當時詹森為能維持中華民國在聯合國的席次，甚至接受魯斯克提議，透過支持研究委員會提案來換取其他國家支持美國的重要問題案。同時，由於國務院本身的專業能力，亦使其在因應聯合國中國代表權問題之決策過程中具主導地位，而國務卿魯斯克在詹森的信任與授權支持下，具有較其他閣員更為直接有效影響的「行動管道」，也使得詹森對聯合國中國代表權問題之看法都是以魯斯克的見解為主。
美國不願出兵支援蔣介石反攻大陸，以及美國因應聯合國「中國代表權」問題時，其實已經隱含詹森政府有意推動「兩個中國」或「一中一臺」的考量與意圖。然而，美國在調整其政策的同時，亦避免因此引發與蘇聯衝突之可能性，以免對其國家利益造成嚴重威脅。因此，透過前述案例的驗證，亦可歸納出本論文的主旨：美國為避免引發美蘇衝突之可能性，在處理中國問題時，詹森政府調整其兩岸政策，以保障美國在國際間之利益。
The 1960s could be considered the beginning of changes of U.S. policy toward China. During the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson’s administrations, the U.S. policy toward China seemed to be not as fixed as that of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower. We could discern that the subtle change by and large came from either the “Republic of China policy of retaking the mainland China” or the issue of “Representation of China” in the United Nations (UN). Therefore, the main purpose of this thesis is to explore the U.S. decision-making process when dealing with China-related issues during the Johnson administration.
Graham Allison''s three models of decision-making process as the main analytical framework, namely Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Behavior Model (OBM), and Government Politics Model (GPM) will be applied in this thesis, analyzing how the United States during Johnson’s years dealt with Taiwan’s military operations on mainland China, PRC’s nuclear tests, and the issue of representation of China in the UN.
First, the Johnson administration’s response to Nationalist China’s military operations on mainland China could be regarded as a continuity of the policy toward Taiwan in the Kennedy administration. Bearing maximal national interest in mind, President Johnson explicitly told Taipei that it would not support Taiwan’s military offensive against Communist China so that an unnecessary nuclear war with the Soviet Union could be avoided. After scrutinizing the consequences of Taiwan’s military operations on mainland China, all departments and agencies of U.S. government believed the acts of Nationalist China government might drag the United States into an unnecessary war, thereby jeopardizing the national interests of the United States. And during the interactive process of bureaucracy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s opinion helped to boost Johnson’s decision in turning down U.S. support of Nationalist China’s unilateral military actions.
Second, President Johnson eventually decided to choose diplomatic means instead of military means in response to red China’s nuclear tests. Actually, each of these two policy options was discussed and supported by different departments in the Johnson administration. Due to insufficiency of CIA’s intelligence report, however, State Department’s assessment incrementally gained the upper hand over CIA report, thus becoming the mainstream views of the administration. As a result, President Johnson took the advice of Rusk-dominated State Department, ending up with responding to Communist China’s nuclear test via diplomatic means merely.
Third, on the issue of representation of China in the UN, President Johnson accepted Dean Rusk’s suggestion in trying every possible means to keep the UN seat under Nationalist China by supporting the founding a study committee designed to win the support of other countries on the Important Question Resolution proposed by Washington. Meanwhile, because of its expertise and capabilities, State Department played the dominant role in the decision-making process on this issue. With President Johnson’s trust and authorization, Secretary Rusk gained more direct and effective access to the president in the decision-making process than other secretaries. As a result, secretary Rusk’s personal opinion had profound impact on President Johnson’s decision on this issue.
Judging from the Johnson administration’s blunt refusal of the request from Nationalist China government in supporting Taiwan’s military operations on Communist China, and the way Washington dealt with the issue of representation of China in the UN, it seemed that the Johnson Administration might have intended to advocate in support of “Two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” policy. However, believing that the possibility of a conflict with the Soviet Union would endanger U.S. national interest, the Johnson administration could not but abandon any adjustment of its China policy. Therefore, the main theme of this thesis is that in order to avoid a possible conflict with the Soviet Union, the Johnson Administration decided to abandon any adjustment of its China policy even though its policy toward China-related issues such as the issue of Taiwan’s military operations on mainland China and the issue of representation of China in the UN were engraved with strong characteristics of “Two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” policy.” |
