哈伯瑪斯在其學思生涯的最新近階段，致力於法律哲學、審議民主及多元文 化社會之探討，皆獲世人之重視。而阿培爾基於其「責任倫理學」的立場，主張 以「策略性行動」解決道德原則在現實情境中難以被遵循的問題；反之，哈伯瑪 斯認為這將摧毀「論辯倫理學」的宗旨，而他認為這個難題應由法律哲學來解決。 「道德原則遵循的不可被期待性」乃因為法律共同體所涉及的事務，原本就 不是僅涉及道德此一面向，自然不是僅憑道德可加以證成；再者，在現代工業社 會中，道德在行動力上的不足，也使其需要法律予以補充。基於出於「自主」理 念的「民主原則」，公共事務應由共同體成員經由涉及「道德的」、「倫理—政治 的」及「實用的」的面向之「論辯」決定，亦藉此賦予法律正當性。哈伯瑪斯將 法律與道德的關係界定為「同源互補」。本計劃將探討哈伯瑪斯的法律建築學設 計、及在此結構下，哈伯瑪斯所界定的兩者之關係是否已經適切。 Habermas devoted himself to the investigation of legal philosophy, deliberative democracy, and multicultural society in the latest phase of his academic career. Apel, inspired by the idea of “responsibility ethics”, holds that the strategic action should serve as the instrument for surmounting the difficulty of the “norm-observing” in the real world. On the contrary, Habermas regards Apel’s assertion as contradictory to the guideline of the “discourse ethics”. Instead of resorting to strategic action he tries to solve this problem through the construction of a legal philosophy. The failure of the warranted expectation of the norm-observing arises from the fact that the issues in a legal community are not only concerned with those of moral nature. Therefore, they cannot be justified by moral consideration alone. Furthermore, in the modern industrial societies moral is often short of the driving force. This is the reason why moral must be functionally complemented by law. Based on the “democracy principle” deriving from the idea of “autonomy” public affairs ought to be determined by all members of a legal community through the “moral”, “ethical-political”, and “pragmatic” discourses. Thereby law acquires its legitimacy. Habermas defines the relationship between law and moral as “same origin, complementary”. This project will deepen into the architectonic of Habermas’ legal philosophy and think over the adequacy of relationship between law and moral described by him.