https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/108978 Search the Channel s https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/simple-search https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/109186 title: 台灣會計師更換之市場反應 abstract: 本文探討台灣會計師更換之市場反應，包含企業更換會計師之方向、原因與 時點之影響。本文以人工方式收集自1993年到2012年間，497筆在公開資訊觀測站上 揭露之會計師更換宣告。實證結果顯示，規模較大的公司若由大型事務所更換到非 大型事務所，市場給予顯著負面評價，若由非大型事務所更換至大型事務所，則市 場給予顯著正面評價。此外，若會計師更換的原因為會計師辭職時，市場將給予顯 著負面評價。當規模較大企業跟隨原簽證會計師由非大型事務所更換到大型事務所 時，股價報酬顯著為負。更換會計師時點對於企業股價報酬有顯著影響，若企業在 當年第一季之前（含）更換當年會計師，市場將給予正面評價。另一方面，與美國 研究不同，台灣資本市場對於會計師更換前期之審計意見，或者更換宣告中是否載 明會計師對於企業內部控制有重大建議事項並未有顯著反應。本文實證結果可供企 業、會計師、投資人與監管機構參考。 This study investigates the market reactions subsequent to auditor switches in Taiwan. We focus on the directions, reasons for, and timings of auditor switches. Using 497 observations of auditor switch, which were hand-collected at the Market Observation Post System the of Taiwan Stock Exchange for the period between 1993 and 2012, we reveal that the market reacts negatively (positively) when a large company switched from a Big N (non-Big N) audit firm to its non-Big N (Big N) counterpart. Furthermore, the market reacts negatively when an auditor resigned or when a large company followed the auditor from a non-Big N to a Big N auditor. The timing of auditor switches is also shown to affect market reactions; i.e., the market tends to react positively to auditor switches in the first quarter. Unlike previous studies conducted in the U.S., the capital market in Taiwan appears not to react to preceding auditors’ modified audit opinions prior to auditor switch or to audit reports indicating internal control weaknesses. This study has implications for companies, auditors, investors, and regulators. <br> Thu, 12 Jan 2017 06:28:01 GMT https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/109185 title: 植基於效率分解資料包絡分析法探究政府審計機關 之績效 abstract: 本研究運用「加法型效率分解資料包絡分析法 （Additive Efficiency Decomposition DEA）」探究政府審計機關「審計效率」與「審計效能」，該模型無法 有效區隔有效率審計機關之排序及內部資源運用之強、弱勢分析，故本研究進一步 結合「以參考網路為基礎之排序法（Network-Based Ranking Method）」，以利區分不 同階段的標竿單位與內部強弱項的資源運用項目分析比較，並探究資本支出規模與 政黨因素對審計機關績效之影響，提供有關單位資源配置與政策推動之參考。而迴 歸分析結果也顯示出，資本支出規模對審計機關的審計效率及效能有顯著之影響。 This study investigates “audit efficiency” and “audit effectiveness” in audit agencies using the Additive Efficiency Decomposition DEA model. The model cannot sufficiently distinguish between audit agencies’ efficiency ranking and strength-weaknesses analysis of their internal resources. Thus, the model is further integrated with Network-Based Ranking Method, so as to distinguish the benchmark units from various stages of analysis and allow strengths and weaknesses of internal resources to be compared. In addition, the study examines the effect of capital expenditure scale and political party affiliation on audit performance. This is to provide relevant agencies with reference in resource allocation and policy implementation. Regression analysis results further indicate that capital expenditure scale has no significant influence on audit efficiency and effectiveness of auditing agencies. <br> Thu, 12 Jan 2017 06:25:30 GMT https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/109184 title: 內部稽核質量與內控缺失 abstract: 內部稽核的角色主要係確保內部控制之有效性，然囿於內稽資料取得不易， 學術研究著墨不多。本研究得於運用台灣獨特之上市櫃公司為研究對象，探討內部 稽核質量對內控缺失之影響。實證結果顯示，就內控缺失與否之分析，內稽品質愈 佳則內控缺失愈少，但未達顯著水準；內稽投入量與內控缺失呈顯著負相關，即內 稽人數投入愈多，內控缺失則愈少。進一步同時納入內稽個別特質（內稽個別適任 條件），證實稽核人員具外稽經驗，會計師或內部稽核師證照之特質愈多，則內控缺 失愈少，呈顯著負相關，但具有資訊專業經驗者與內控缺失，呈顯著正相關。至於 內部稽核質量與內控缺失比率之關係，其實證結果相似於內控缺失與否。整體而言， 內稽具備優質適任條件，投入較多內稽人力，則有助於內部控制更能落實。 The primary role played by internal audit is to assure the effectiveness of internal control within a company. However, there is little research in this area due to the difficulty in accessing internal audit data. Using Taiwanese listing firms as research objects, the study investigates the effect of internal audit quality and quantity on internal control weakness (ICW). Empirical results indicate that the better the internal audit quality the less the ICW, although this is not statistically significant. Meanwhile, significant negative association exists between internal audit input and ICW, indicating that the more the internal audit input the less the ICW. In addition, the study further incorporated individual attributes of internal auditors and found significant negative association, indicating there is less ICW when internal auditors have external audit experiences, CPA or CIA license. On the other hand, significant positive association exists between internal auditors with information technology experiences and ICW. Relationship studies between the attributes of internal auditors and ICW ratio produce similar findings. To sum up, competence quality of internal auditors and more internal audit input are beneficial to implementing the internal control system. <br> Thu, 12 Jan 2017 06:20:04 GMT https://tkuir.lib.tku.edu.tw/dspace/handle/987654321/109047 title: 銷管費用僵固性、帝國建立動機與公司治理個別機制之成效 abstract: 本研究以2005年至2012年台灣上市櫃公司的公司年資料為樣本驗證Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis (2012)帝國建立動機是銷管費用僵固性成因之發現，並進一步探討公 司治理個別機制是哪些帝國建立動機所造成僵固性的抑制對策。本研究發現以自由 現金流量、總經理任期、總經理離職前、與總經理變動薪酬比率四個變數衡量的帝 國建立動機，都會造成銷管費用僵固性。本研究也發現，法人持股比率越高、董事 會規模越小、獨立董事比率越大、與總經理兼任董事長，各分別越能抑制一至三項 帝國建立動機造成之僵固性，而且台灣公司治理個別機制的整體設計有「所有帝國 建立動機所造成的僵固性都能抑制」與「每一個別機制都是有效的，且不會負向增 強僵固性」的良好特質。 This paper uses a sample of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange over the 2005-2012 period to examine whether the stickiness of selling, general, and administrative costs (SGA costs) can be attributed to the empire building incentives of managers, as hypothesized by Chen, Lu, and Sougiannis (2012). This paper also explores whether individual corporate governance mechanisms can help alleviate SGA cost stickiness caused by the empire building incentives. I adopt free cash flow, CEO’s tenure, CEO’s short horizon, and CEO’s variable pay ratio as proxies for empire building incentives. The results provide evidence to support the Chen et al.(2012)’s hypothesis. Moreover, the adoption of individual corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., higher institutional ownership ratio, smaller board size, higher ratio of outside directors, and CEO’s duality) help alleviate cost stickiness imposed by some (one to three) empire building incentives. Furthormore, the empirical evidence indicates that the corporate governance mechanisms of firms in Taiwan’s tend to forestall all incentives to empire building. In addition, each of the mechanisms helps to alleviate some of these incentive problems, without imposing adverse side-effects. <br> Tue, 27 Dec 2016 08:53:36 GMT