

台灣國防改革：一個綜觀的角度

Taiwan Defense Reform: An Overview Perspective

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軍事組織畢竟無法絕緣於政治與社會的範疇外，它們不僅必須對周遭環境有所回應，而且也有義務應當如此。它們本身是現實環境的一部份；同時，也形塑著它們必須加以回應的情勢。因此，戰爭型態的創新與改革觸及了許多軍、文領域裡的議題。(彼得·佩瑞)¹

Military institutions, after all, are not objects isolated in political and social space; they are not only responsive to their surroundings, but also responsible them. They themselves are part of reality; they also create situations to which they must react. Innovation and reform in warfare touch on numerous issues in the military and civilian spheres. (Peter Paret)¹

引言

Introduction

即令在就任總統之前，陳水扁先生可說是當今少數能夠熟稔國防事務並與軍方有頻繁之個人接觸的政治人物之一。一九九二年，陳水扁總統（當時還是立委）成爲第一位在野的國會議員被選爲國防委員會的召委，他在國防委員會的鮮明表現不僅使得他成爲媒體寵兒，也創造了一項傳統。民進黨立委在國防上的專注並且堅信推動軍隊改革從他開始，前後三代的具有改革理念的民進黨立委成爲國會裡持續推動軍事改革的動力：第一代是陳水扁（一九九〇到一九九六年）、黃煌雄（一九八七到一九九〇年、一九九三到一九九六年），第二代是張旭成（一九九三年迄今）、蔡

明憲（一九九六至二〇〇二年），現在的第三代是陳忠信（一九九九年迄今）、李文忠（一九九九年迄今）。許多台灣國防改革的成就來自於陳水扁立委當時的構想：二〇〇〇年通過的《國防法》在內容上很大部分源自於他在一九九一年提出的《國防組織法》草案——此一版本是當時有關國防組織改革的破冰之作。他與助理柯承亨（現在是國安會副秘書長）在一九九二年出版的《國防黑盒子與白皮書》揭示了他對於國防改革的完整願景，即使在今天，該書仍然是瞭解與從事台灣國防改革必讀的作品。同時，他與許多開明派的高階將領——例如空軍的唐飛（後來成爲陳水扁第一任的行政院長）與李天羽（現爲空軍總司令）有著密切的交往。在他就任總統之後，已爲立法院通過的《國防法》業已鋪陳了一個可以讓文人領導階層進行國防改革的新架構。對於許多觀察家而言，此一新的架構與陳在軍中的人脈，與——更重要的一——陳是一個具有改革理念與足夠的國防事務知識的年輕總統，台灣的國防改革將迫在眉梢。

Even before President Shui-Bian Chen took his office in 2000, he had been one of few contemporary politicians in Taiwan who being familiar with defense affairs and having considerable personal connection with the military. In 1992, President Shui-Bain Chen, then a legislator, was the first opposition member being elected as the convener of the National Defense Committee in Legislative Yuan; his sharp performance in the Committee not only made him a favorite of local press, but also created a tradition. Since then, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislators' concentration on defense affairs and commitment for reforming the military has already become a belief. Three generations of reform-minded DPP legislators constitute a continuous momentum for pushing Taiwan's military to reform: Shui-Bian Chen (during 1990-1996) and Huang-Hsiung Huang (during 1987-1990, 1993-1996) in the first wave, Parris H. Chung (since 1993) and Michael M. Tsai (during 1996-2002) in the second wave, and Chung-Shin Chen (since 1999) and Wen-Chung Li (since 1999) in the current wave. Many achievements of Taiwan's defense reform were in fact came from *Legislator* Shui-Bian Chen's ideas: Many parts of Taiwan's *National Defense Law* (legislated in 2000) were rooted upon his proposed draft of *National Defense Organization Law* in 1991 – an icebreaking initiative regarding defense organization reform at the time. He and his staff Chen-Heng Ko (now Deputy Secretary-General of National Security Council) published *White Paper on the Black Box of Defense* in 1992; a 500-page volume exhibited their comprehensive vision on Taiwan's defense reform. Even today, this book is still a must for understanding or undertaking Taiwan's defense reform. Meanwhile, Chen kept close relation with some open-minded top officers, such as Air Force (ROCAF) General Fei Tang (Chief of General Staff during 1998-1999; Minister of National Defense during 1999-2000; later became Chen's first Premier) and Tan-Yu Li (now Commander-in-Chief of the ROCAF). When Chen took his office in 2000, the legislated National Defense Law already in place provided a new framework for civilian leadership to commence defense reform. For many observers, given this new framework, Chen's connection with senior military leadership, and, most importantly, young President Chen himself being reform-minded as well as having sufficient knowledge of defense affairs, they conceived Taiwan's defense reform was about to *happen*.

儘管如此，在二〇〇二年後，對於台灣國防改革的期待開始變成催促甚至是批

評或責難。早在二〇〇一年十二月，美國高階官員與國防專家催促台灣進行國防改革，並認為國防改革的成敗攸關台美軍事交流。² 二〇〇三年，美台商會在美國聖安東尼舉辦國防工業研討會，美國國務院亞太副助卿告訴台灣的代表：「台灣政軍領導人都理解到台灣的軍隊需要改革，此一改革計畫中許多項目業已進行中，我們知道貴國一方面軍隊正在積極轉型，另一方面還在調適改組後的組織。『不過，需要作的地方還很多。』」³ 特別是，台灣對於布希政府二〇〇一年的軍售清單遲遲未能進行採購，引起美國人對於台灣人自我防衛意願的質疑。最後，華盛頓郵報記者潘文在二〇〇三年十月露骨地說：「美國官員表示許多台灣官員——包括陳水扁總統在內——都不願意與軍方抗衡來推動改革，其他人則是根本沒有認識到台灣需要改進其戰力。台灣政府官員與立委視改革之路為畏途。」美國人協助台灣軍事改革不遺餘力，但他引述顧崇廉（前海軍總司令，現為立委）的話說：「儘管美國對此案多所努力，但迄今仍無進展。」⁴ 潘文認為台灣國防改革的障礙就是無能的文人與保守的軍隊。

Nevertheless, expectation of Taiwan's defense reform became to evolve into urge, and even criticism or accusation after 2002. Earlier in December 2001, high ranking US officials and defense experts were urging Taiwan to reform its national defense and regarded the success or failure of Taiwan's defense reforms as key to US-Taiwan military exchanges.² In the US-Taiwan Business Council Defense Industry Conference, San Antonio, 2003, Randall Schriver, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, told Taiwanese delegations, "As Taiwan's political and military leaders have recognized Taiwan military needs to reform. There are several elements of this reform program that are underway and we realize you are still adjusting to this reorganization as your military carries out ongoing transitions. *But much still needs to be done.*"³ In particular, Taiwan's indecision on the procurement of arms sale package that proposed by Bush Administration in 2001 induced Americans to doubt Taiwanese willing to defend themselves. The *Washington Post* journalist John Pomfret's article in October 2003 could tell the stiffest criticism from the US side. "US officials said many Taiwanese officials, including President Chen Shui-bian," he asserted, "are reluctant to lock horns with the powerful military to push the reforms; others have not acknowledged that Taiwan needs to improve its war-fighting capabilities. Taiwanese government officials and legislators acknowledged the pace of change was glacial." The US took whatever it could to assist Taiwan's defense, "the US has put a lot efforts into this project," he quoted Nelson Ku (former Commander-in-Chief of ROC Navy during 1994-1997, now a legislator), "but there's really no improvement."⁴ Explicit in Pomfret's arguments, incompetent civilian and conservative military are two genuine obstacles in Taiwan's defense reform.

儘管潘文的說法是誤導的，而且顯然低估了台灣國防改革決策環境的複雜度，但本文的目的不在於反駁這篇報導。本文試圖從更大的政治與社會範疇去看台灣國防改革的複雜性，並去觀察台灣政軍領導人的變革策略與焦點。本文認為：台灣現在的國防改革進程，雖然離全面性的成功還有很長的距離，但絕非失敗。在陳水扁總統或是湯耀明部長領導下，台灣的國防改革在建立國家化與專業化軍隊方面上已打下深厚的基礎，一個可以持續推動改革的基礎。當然，這對於期待以軍事事務革

命的轟轟烈烈方式看到台灣進行國防改革的人，必然是會感到失望與不滿。不過，像台灣寧靜的政治革命前例一樣，陳總統與湯部長都策略性地採取了漸進式、合作式的改革途徑。這或許是在台灣複雜的決策環境下，他們不得不然的選擇。

Pomfret's reasoning is misled and obviously oversimplifies the complexity of decision-making environment of Taiwan's defense reform; however, the overarching goal of this paper does not intend to confute it. Rather, the author attempts to observe the complexities embedded in Taiwan's defense reform from a broader societal and political context and to assess the reform strategies and focuses that civilian and military leadership adapt. This essay argues that although the development of Taiwan's defense reform is far from a total success, but it does NOT fail. Under leadership of President Chen and Minister Yiou-Ming Tang, they have already established a sound foundation of Taiwan's defense reform by creating a nationalized and professional military, a foundation for lasting reform. Of course, for those who prefer to see the Taiwan's defense reform is in a groundbreaking pace or RMA (revolution in military affairs) fashion, it is indeed an unpleasant and disappointed result. However, like the so-called "quiet revolution" precedent of Taiwan political reform, both President Chen and Minister Tang act strategically and adapt an evolutionary, cooperative approach to reform. Given the complex decision-making environment, this may be the only option available for them.

迷思與現實

Myths and Realities

在研究或遂行國防改革所經常產生的一個迷思來自於對「改革」一語的使用。儘管在許多論述中，這個名詞是和「調整」、「創新」、「轉型」、「現代化」或是更簡單的「改變」等名詞互用的，但使用「改革」或其他類似的名詞都隱含著正面的意義。改革被看成就是進步。不過，從歷史的觀點上看，這樣的意涵是有問題的。例如，法國人在第二次世界大戰前進行了錯誤的軍事改革，而且正因他們成功地執行此一改革，法國軍隊在一九四〇年敗得更慘。而且，改革也有時與手上所遭遇到的問題無關。美國陸軍固然在一九六〇、七〇年代達成了許多顯著的改革，但這些立基在歐陸與前蘇聯進行全面戰爭假設之上的改革，無助於美國避免輸掉在越南所進行的游擊戰。簡言之，儘管「改革」一語在政治上極具吸引力，但必須要知道的是「改革」可能朝向錯誤的方向或是不相干的，更經常發生的是：「改革」也有可能失敗。從這樣的角度，「改革」並不保證必然會增加國家相對的軍事能力或真正能應付手頭上的問題。再怎麼立意良善的「改革」也有徹底失敗的可能，除非改革的理念能有說服力並被順利地擴散出去，除非改革的措施能有技巧地管理並被全心全意的執行下去。

In researching and conducting defense reform, the usage of "reform" frequently produces a profound myth. Although many literatures treated this term interchangeably with adjustment, innovation, transformation, modernization, or, simply change, the linguistic implication of using "reform" and other similar terms is still heavily laden with positive value. The meaning of reform is still associated with improvement. From historical perspective, such an implication was of question. French military reform during

the interwar period, for example, was a false one and its successful implementation only multiplied the disaster in 1940. Also, a reform could be irrelevant to the problems at hand. The US Army did make some impressive reforms based upon the assumption of a general war in Europe with former Soviet Union in the 60s and 70s while its soldiers were losing a guerrilla style conflict in Vietnam. In short, the term of “reform” may be politically attractive, but it would be worth recognizing that “reform” may be false, irrelevant, and, more frequently, failed. From this point of view, “reform” does not necessarily guarantee an improvement of a state’s relative military capabilities or a very solution to problems at hand. A well-intentioned reform still could fail unless reform ideas are convincing and smoothly diffused, unless reform undertakings are skillful managed and full-heartedly implemented.

國防改革、變革或創新並非單一事件，而是一個過程，它是「累積下來的合成物，而不是單一的決定」。⁵ 在真實世界中，有關決策與決定的複雜性來自於國防改革（特別是在承平時期）很少是發生在真空之中，而是在一個複雜的政治脈絡中，在哪裡決策者總是發現他們同時面臨到許多不同的需求。這些不同需求的優先順位經常難以決定，因為它們即便不是完全不相容就是相互衝突。首先，某些人希望達成的成果，對另外一批人就不一樣了。改變本質上是衝突性的，有受惠於政策的一方，也有必須為此承受代價的另一方。其次，改革措施「用來解決某一問題，往往衍生其他的問題。組織效能的評估取決於許多因素，某些因素間並不相容。因之，形成兩難。」在若干可達成組織目標的條件上達成進展，經常會受到來自相等重要的其他條件的干擾。解決舊問題時往往滋生了新問題。⁶ 除此之外，「有關變革的決定總是帶有風險的。歷史上有太多戰敗的例子是因為它的軍隊沒有進行變革或是變革的方向錯誤。」⁷ 變革不是免費的午餐，它所費不貲。它會引起辯論與鬥爭，行為者必須花時間、心力並動員資源。「改革經常是困難的，因為它牽涉到做些不一樣的事，把變革引進到一個社會系統中，難以避免地會帶來相當程度的不確定、風險與危殆。」⁸ 變革有正面也又負面兩種面向，一方面變革意謂實驗並創造出新的東西來，但另一方面，變革也意謂不連貫性與以往所熟悉的架構與關係的破壞。儘管，變革有正面的特質，但因為它會帶來未知與生疏而可能被排拒。同時，變革不一定會達成所企盼的目標，即使有，也經常伴隨著些不想要的、不受歡迎的副產品。

It is widely recognized that reform, change, or innovation is not a singular event but a process. It “is more the result of accretion than of any single decision.”⁵ In reality, the complexity concerning decision-making and decision itself because a defense reform, particularly in peacetime, rarely occurs in an isolated vacuum, but in a complex political context where decision-makers always find themselves encounter various demands simultaneously. The priority of these different demands is hard to be decided since they may be in conflict, if not total incompatible. First, a desirable outcome for one may be a less desirable outcome for another. Change is inherently conflictual because it imposes costs on some and provides benefits in terms of favorable policy on others. Second, reform undertakings “instituted to solve one problem often create others because effectiveness in an organization depends on many factors, some of which are incompatible with others; hence, the dilemma.” The very improvements in some conditions that further the achievement of the organization’s objectives often interfere with other condi-

tions equally important for this purpose. New problems are internally generated in organizations in the process of solving old ones.⁶ Meanwhile, “decisions about change have always been risk-laden. History abounds with examples of armies which lost because they did not change or because they made the wrong change.”⁷ Change is not a free lunch; it costs. It causes debates and struggles. Actors need to take time, pay attention, and mobilize resources on it. “Change is difficult because it involves doing something new. The introduction of reform practices into a social system implies actions that entail a certain amount of uncertainty, risk, or hazard.”⁸ Change has both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, change implies experiment and the creation of something new. On the other hand, change means discontinuity and the destruction of familiar structures and relationships. Despite the positive attributes, changes can be resisted because it involves confrontation with the unknown and loss of the familiar. Additionally, changes do not always achieve the goals intended by their proponents; and even if they do, they may bring with them unintended and unwelcome consequences.

有些兩難會帶來難以預料的政治後果，而有些則明顯地構成改革的重大阻礙。贊成者可能會看到改革的好處，反對者則強調改革的風險。而對決策者而言，利益與成本必須同時加以權衡。因此，成本、風險與不確定使得改革的決策環境大為複雜。基於前述理由，經常可以見到決策者為了預留退路或政治操作空間會刻意避免做出堅定的承諾。其結果是：不僅「做決定」是複雜的，而「決定」本身也經常是模糊而留待主觀詮釋。決定的內容往往不是非黑即白，而且灰暗不明。

Some dilemmas may induce unpredictable political consequence while others evidently constitute weighty obstacles for reform. The advocacy group is likely to see the benefits of the proposed reform while the resistance group views things differently by emphasizing the costs of such an undertaking. To decision-makers, however, both benefit and costs must take into consideration altogether. Therefore, cost, risk, and uncertainty further complicate the decision-making of reform. For these two reasons, it is not uncommon that decision-makers will, in order to preserve rooms for political maneuver or route of retreat, deliberately avoid making a firm commitment. As a consequence, not only *to make decision* but also *decision itself* is complicated and opens to subjective interpretations. Rather than being a clear-cut one, substance of the decision is often ambiguous and hazy.

這些兩難會發生在兩個層次上：在（大）戰略層次上，要在軍事考量、外交目標、經濟發展、政治穩定間的找出優先順序，文人領導階層經常感到相當的困難。例如：國防改革的目的可能在增加國家武裝部隊的軍事效能，然而此一效能增加有時是不可行的或是根本就有害於軍隊所捍衛的國家政治體制、經濟或社會。

The dilemmas can occurred at two different levels: At the (grand) strategic level, the priority settings among military consideration, diplomatic goal, economic development, and political stability often involve profound dilemmas for civilian leadership. For example, the purpose of defense reform can be to achieve improvements in military effectiveness of a state's armed forces; but such a military improvement sometimes is unfeasible or even harmful to whom armed forces protect -- says, a state's polity, economy, or society.

即令在（純）軍事領域內，軍事效能也有許多面向。軍事行動發生在許多層次上：像是政治、戰略、作戰、戰術等諸層次。每個層次都有其判準來權衡軍事組織的效能。然而，「某一層次效能的前提可能會與其他層次的相衝突。當此一衝突發生，組織會刻意選擇減少某一層次的效能以去強化另一層次的效能。」⁹此外，對於面臨到明顯的敵情威脅卻缺乏足夠資源的軍隊而言，戰備與改革的選擇往往是非常痛苦的。¹⁰組織或許會因為想到得到更多的資源（人力、預算等等）而進行改革，但充裕的國防預算並不能保證就會有成功的改革。不過，萎縮的預算確實會不利於從事非傳統的任務與實驗所需的緩衝。¹¹

Even at the (pure) military realm, the military effectiveness has many different facets. Military activity takes place at many levels, says political, strategic, operational, and tactical. Each level has its own verdict to assess the effectiveness that military organization may need to pursuit for. However, “the prerequisites for effectiveness at one level may conflict with those at another. When such conflicts occur, the organization may have to make deliberate choice to diminish effectiveness at one level in order to enhance effectiveness at other levels.”⁹ Moreover, for an army who faces conceivable external threats but wanting sufficient resource, trade-off between readiness and innovation is a particular painful choice.¹⁰ Organizations may be driven to innovate for seizing more resource (manpower, budget etc.), but a luxury defense budget does not guarantee a successful military innovation. But, a shrinking resource often allows less “slack” for non-traditional tasks and experiments.¹¹

權衡

Trade-offs

台灣目前的國防改革處於複雜的內外環境中。以下，我們提出至少四項政軍決策者在考量台灣國防改革所需要權衡做出選擇之處：

Taiwan's ongoing defense reform is emerging within complicated external and internal contexts. We identify at least four different sets of trade-off that civilian or military decision-makers need to take into their consideration of defense reform:


一、台灣軍事政策與台美關係的權衡：美國——作為台灣安全的主要提供者——對於台灣國防改革的態度並不如大家所想得那樣清楚。儘管美國鼓勵台灣軍隊發揮主動進行改革，但美國並不支持若干台灣所提出的選項，特別是那些具有攻勢意涵的。藉由表達關切或直接拒絕台灣在這方面的武器需求，使得外交關係產生疑慮，並粉碎那些改革的理念。舉例來說，目前台灣空軍提出「反制作戰」（在中國犯台之前或之後打擊中國內陸目標）創新的作戰構想引起美方的疑慮，美方再三表達關切並要求台灣方面說明此一構想的具體內容。

1) Trade-off between Taiwan military policy and Taiwan-US relation: The stance of the US, as *the* external provider of Taiwan's security, is not so clear in Taiwan defense reform. Although the US encourages Taiwan's armed forces to show more initiative in

reform; it often disapproves some certain proposed options by Taiwanese particularly those have offensive implication. The American discomfort in forms of expressing concerns or simply turning down Taiwan's requested procurement in this regard often leads to diplomatic anxiety and crushes the innovative concepts. For example, the ROCAF's current innovative operational concepts of "Countermeasure Operation" -- to attack China's inland targets immediately after or before Taiwan being attacked -- caused the US suspicion. The US repeatedly expressed concerns about this idea and urged Taiwanese counterparts to clarify its meaning.

二、軍事政策與經濟發展的權衡：從一九九〇年代末期，台灣經濟相對衰頹，而要求增加社會福利支出的呼聲日益高漲。如同圖一所示，台灣國防預算在二〇〇一年時降至國民生產毛額百分之三以下，在二〇〇二年時更向下探底至百分之二·五此一歷史最低點。文人領導階層認為民進黨執政時期應將經濟發展視為最重要與最急迫的任務並不單單只為了內政上的理由。面臨到中國快速與全面的經濟吸納，¹²民進黨政府認為應當要趕快振興經濟競爭力，以確保台灣總體安全的地位。二〇〇三年時，陸委會主委蔡英文表示：短期間內台灣應集中注意力在兩岸的經貿議題上，然後，在中期（二〇〇六至二〇〇七年）再轉移焦點到軍事議題上。¹³ 國防預算緊縮的結果是：改革者所提的實驗或採購，往往被認為是華而不實而備受抵制。同時，在既有預算規模下，國防部無法負擔大型軍事投資案所需的支出，而必須求助於高度政治爭議性的特別預算案的挹注。

圖一 國防預算在政府總預算與國民生產毛額當中所佔之比例




Source: The MND (September 2003).
 The figures listed above are slightly different from those in *National Defense Report 2002*.

2) Trade-off between Taiwan military policy and economic development: Since the late 1990s, Taiwan's economy is relatively declining while domestic urge to increase spending on social welfare is also demanding. As FIGURE-1 shows, Taiwan's defense budget sharply dropped below 3% of gross national product (GNP) in fiscal year 2000 and even dived to the historically lowest point of 2.50% of GNP in fiscal year 2002. Civilian leadership believes the economy development should prioritize as the first and immediate task for the DDP government not only due to domestic reasons. Facing China's rapidly and extensive economic absorption strategy against Taiwan,¹² DDP government perceives the need to restore vigorously Taiwanese economic competitiveness in order to safeguard Taiwan's overall security position. Ing-Wen Tsai, Chairperson of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, argued in 2003 that Taiwan should focus on the cross-strait economic and trading issues in short term, and later shift to military issues in intermediate term (2006-2007).¹³ As a result of decreasing Taiwan's defense budget in recent years, some military experiments and procurements proposed by reformists are

regarded as indulgent and unpromising. Meanwhile, since the existing size of defense budget cannot afford the large military investment programs, Ministry of National Defense (MND) has no other choices but seek to highly controversial special budget bill for funding.

FIGURE-1 THE PROPORTION OF DEFENSE BUDGET IN TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET AND GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT



Source: The MND (September 2003).

The figures listed above are slightly different from those in *National Defense Report 2002*.

三、軍事改變與政治安定的權衡：台灣內部政治環境的複雜或甚至是混亂使得台灣國防改革的困難度加大。首先，在台灣民主化之後，台灣國防政策變得更為透明與公開，但這有些後遺症，因為國防決策系統，特別是在行政與立法部門間，變得「更加複雜，協同性降低，甚至陷入內部不休的爭辯中。」其結果是「中央政府的決策能力被大大削弱。」¹⁴ 其次，國會陣營內泛綠陣營與泛藍陣營因為意識型態的對壘，常常波及到國防議題，特別是在重大的採購案上。例如：二〇〇二至二〇〇三年紀德艦的採購案儘管有台灣政軍領導階層的堅定背書，依舊在國會遭到強烈的反對。反對黨成功地延遲相關預算的通過，而且要不是美國在台協會介入，本案

幾乎就要被喊停。第三，台灣整體政治體制的設計不利於改革。一方面是強調穩定、公平勝過於變革、彈性，在文官系統內，政黨輪替除了更換首長、引進不到十位政治任命人員外，既有官僚體系幾乎毫不受到影響，他們的工作受到法律的保護，不能僅因不好的工作表現就解雇他們。這不但使得推動新的政策時可能帶來程度不一的內部阻力外，對於國防改革也有深刻的影響。國防部在《國防部組織法》修正案通過，依法在國防部本部需有三分之一文官員額（即二〇二員，不含特任官二人），國防部曾積極希望引進高達四十員的政務官來負責政策規劃及決策工作。被外界認為「傳統」的國防部所提出的想法極為先進與開明，反倒是文官系統的人事行政局與考試院以文官規定否決了此一構想。另一方面，憲政規定的模糊顯現在《國防法》第七條的規定上，該條文規定：中華民國之國防體制架構為：總統、國家安全會議、行政院與國防部。總統雖有人事權並透過定期的軍事會談在國防決策權上擁有最終的權力，但資源分配與政策執行卻在行政院，而沒有實質權限的國家安全會議在國防決策上的影響力經常是隱性的。權責分散的結果，使得任何改革所需的諮商與協調變得非常費力。最後，軍事變革可能在軍隊內部帶來衝擊，若未有妥適的變革策略，極可能會引發諸如軍種敵對等負面效果。目前台灣的軍隊發動兵變以推翻文人政府的機率幾乎是零，但由於軍隊內的和諧與團結被認為是軍隊效能的重要指標之一，也會被外界拿來作為檢驗文人政府統御能力。為了軍中穩定，任何的變革措施必須要十分注意軍中的反應。陳政府就任之初重用退役的唐飛將軍，被認為與穩定軍隊有關。¹⁵ 由（純）文人擔任國防部部長，一直是以往民進黨在野時積極推動的構想，但似乎也是基於同樣的考慮，還是選擇了在軍中有實質影響力的前參謀總長湯耀明擔任部長，並給予在國防事務上相當的自主與敬重。

3) Trade-off between military change and political stability: Compounding the difficulties for Taiwan's defense reform is the complex, if not chaotic, domestic political arena. First, following in the wake of Taiwan's democratization, the defense policy process in Taiwan has become more open and transparent. But there has been a backlash inasmuch as the system of defense policy-making has "became more complex, less coordinated, and often subject to internal wrangling." As a result, "this situation has arguably weakened the decision-making capacity of the central government."¹⁴ Second, the ideological confrontation between Pan-Green and Pan-Blue camps in the Legislative Yuan often spill over into defense issues, particularly vital procurements. For example, although Taiwan's civilian and military leadership had endorsed the procurement of four KIDD DDGs, it still encountered stiff opposition in Legislative Yuan during 2002-2003. The Opposition successfully delayed the passage of related budget and nearly halted the program to a full stop until the American Institute in Taiwan came to intervene. Third, the institutional design of Taiwan's government does not promote change. On one hand, such a design emphasizes more on stability and fairness than reform and flexibility. Taiwan's stiff civil servant system makes the transition of regime nearly meaningless: New government could only introduce approximately ten new officers (including minister, his (her) deputy, and no more than ten political appointees) in any given ministry. The old bureaucracy remains intact. Their jobs are well protected by law. They cannot be sacked simply by the reason of poor performance. Such a design not only prompts more or less internal resistance when minister tries to push a new policy but also registers a profound impact on military reform. The legislation of the amended

Organizational Act of the MND requires one-third civilian staff in the MND (202 in total, excluding minister, and one deputy minister). The MIND enthusiastically sought to introduce 40 political appointees to take charge of policy planning and decision-making. However, it was civilian Central Personnel Administration and Examination Yuan used obsolete civil service regulation to veto this advanced and open-minded idea proposed by the supposed "conservative" MND. On the other hand, the Article 7 of *National Defense Law* reflects the ambiguity of *ROC Constitution*. The article states, for example, Taiwan's national defense system is structured as the following elements: President, National Security Council, Executive Yuan, and MND. President has authority to assign high-ranking officers and exerts commanding influence on defense decision-making through the mechanism of military meetings, while the Executive Yuan is responsible for the resource allocation and policy implementation. The influence of National Security Council on defense issues is always blurred since the Council has no authority on policy execution. As a result of authority dispersion, the consultation and cooperation required by defense reform becomes very laborious and lengthy. Finally, military changes always bring about impacts within armed forces; if poorly managed, it could possibly cause appalling effects such as interservice rivalry. At the present, the possibility of military coup d'état to topple civilian government in Taiwan is virtually zero. However, the harmony and cohesion within the armed forces are often regarded as critical index of military effectiveness as well as criterion for outsiders to judge the capacity of civilian leadership. For the stability of armed forces, any reform undertakings must be very sensitive to possible responses from the military. Some argued that President Chen's decision to appoint former Minister of National Defense Fei Tang to the position of Premier in 2000 was blatantly political. President Chen was striving to reassure the loyalty of the military to his administration and cultivate healthy civil-military relations.¹⁵ Also, based upon the similar reason, President Chen chose former Chief of Staff General Tang, who having substantial influence within the military, as his Minister of National Defense even the goal of having a (pure) civilian Defense Minister is a long desirable one that the DDP pushed so hard before. Minister Tang was delegated respectable autonomy in defense issues.

四、在改革與戰備之間的權衡：對台灣改革催促更厲的力量是中國人民解放軍的軍備擴充。不意外的，台灣軍方展開軍事現代化計畫的主要動力之一是因為人民解放軍最近取得先進的海空裝備與對台飛彈部署的急速增加。文人政府與美國方面催促台灣軍方要儘快追上並拉平人民解放軍的軍備擴充。許多分析家認為在武器的質量上，解放軍超前台灣已經不再是不可不可能的事，而是時間長短的問題。一份最近的研究指出，解放軍可在二〇〇七年完成對台構成可信威脅的準備。¹⁶ 台灣的國防部也承認中國的海空戰力可能在二〇一〇年超過台灣。¹⁷ 然而，或許與直覺相反，此一時間壓力，對國防改革來講是喜憂參半的。贊成與抗拒的動力幾乎都基於同一動機：一方面，反對者主張當務之急在於強化戰備，並認為改革會引發可能的不穩定，從而犧牲應付「目前」敵人的「現有」戰備；另一方面，贊成者則認為打破架構的大改變是迫切需要的，並建議應建立應付「未來」敵人的能力以換取「日後」較多的投資報酬率。

4) Trade-off between reform and readiness: Pressing even more heavily on Taiwan's

defense reform is the build-up of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). It is not surprising that one of the main driving forces for Taiwan's military to embark on a program of military modernization is the PLA's recent acquisition of advanced air and naval platforms and ever-increasing missile deployment purportedly aimed at Taiwan. Consequently, Taiwan's military is hard pressed to catching up, or match, the PLA's build-up as quickly as possible by both the civilian leadership and by the US. Many analysts, both in Taiwan and the US, believe that the PLA outpacing Taiwan weapons in quality is no longer an issue of possibility but a matter of time. A recent study, for example, concluded that the PLA would complete its preparation to present a credible threat to Taiwan by 2007.¹⁶ Even Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) also admitted that the PLA air and naval combat power might "qualitatively surpass that of ours by 2010."¹⁷ This time pressure, perhaps counterintuitively, has proved to be a mix blessing in defense reform. Conflicting momentums between advocacy and resistance are based upon the identical motivation: On one hand, opponents conceive the imperative of strengthening readiness and argue the *current* military effectiveness to deal the *current* enemy would be sacrificed by possible instability caused by reform. Proponents, on the other hand, believe a frame-breaking change is needed and propose a capability to deal the *future* enemy may have higher returns in the *future*.

許多在場的軍職人員或許熟悉相互關連的邏輯：在發展一項武器時，改變一個零件可能會帶來一連串的改变而花上更多時間與金錢。採用一項武器，同樣地也經常得還要改變其他的武器、戰術或組織。單一的權衡只需要單一的選擇。然而，當許多項權衡一起作用時，複雜於焉產生，線性因果關係與輸入項及輸出項的比例關係將不復存在。紀德艦的採購案是一個典型的相互關連性的案例，它涉及前述四項權衡中的一、三及四項。在二〇〇一年的軍售清單，為增強台灣水面艦隊，美方同意出售四艘九千噸級紀德級驅逐艦，這四艘大型艦遠遠超過過去海軍所操作過的。紀德艦不是新船，這些建於七〇年代末期的紀德艦比起台灣所想要的神盾級艦，在性能上當然略遜一籌。不過，海軍裡的贊成者認為，紀德艦相對便宜，獲得速度較快，可以迅速編入戰鬥序列，一方面達成李傑將軍所提出的「遠洋機動」的海軍願景，二方面可以淘汰現有老舊陽字級驅逐艦。他們認為：儘管紀德艦是七〇年代的設計，但它強大的防空能力、戰管能力、武力投射能力仍然較之現有新型但較小的各級巡防艦（如成功級、拉法葉級、濟陽級）來得好很多。¹⁸

Many military personnel in this room may be familiar with the logic of interconnection: in developing a weapon, to change one part is likely to call for a series of pouring alterations that consume much time and money. The adoption of one weapon similarly often requires changes in other weapons, in tactics, and in organization. A single set of trade-off requires single choice. However, when various sets of trade-off function together, it produces complexity where both linear causality and proportional relations between inputs and output are largely absent. The procurement of KIDD DDGs is a typical case of interconnection which involving the first, third and fourth sets of trade-off. In 2001 arms sale package, the US agreed to sell Taiwan four 9000-ton KIDD DDGs – much larger ships than the ROCN ever operated -- in order to strengthen Taiwanese surface fleet. The KIDD DDGs are not new ships; the performance and function of these twenty-year-old ships are of course inferior to AEGIE-equipped ships, the fa-

favorite choice of the ROCN. However, proponents in the Navy believed that KIDD DDGs are much cheaper and easier to obtain. These ships could be assigned into order of battle shortly. First, this acquisition can fulfill ROCN's new concept of "Ocean-Going Maneuver" in *Navy Vision*, which had been proposed by Admiral Jei Lee (Commander-in-Chief of ROCN from 1999-2002, was appointed as Chief of General Staff in 2002). Second, these ships can replace the existing obsolete YANG DDGs within a very short timeframe. They argued even the design of KIDD is of 70s, its strong capabilities in air defense, battle management, and power projection still far better than current modern but smaller FFGs such as CHENKUNG (PERRY), KANGDING (LA FAYETTE), and CHINYANG (KNOX).¹⁸

紀德艦採購案引發軍種敵視甚至於軍種內的敵視，並在國會引發朝野的對抗。二〇〇一年四月，一位在野黨立委指出紀德艦的十二項缺失（其中若干為外洩自軍方的機密資料），他認為：紀德艦大而無當，國防部應該拒買。隨後，抨擊聲浪大增，六月間，國防部暫不在次年（二〇〇二）的年度預算中編列紀德艦採購預算，以讓海軍有時間向立委說服。二〇〇二年四月起海軍再為紀德艦爭取立法院的支持時，又遭到抗拒，海軍被斥責為「全世界最後剩下的凱子」。同時，出現了省下紀德艦採購以繼續向美方爭取神盾艦的呼聲。六月，漢光演習電腦兵棋推演出現紀德艦全軍覆沒，此一結果被刻意暴露。同月，親民黨主席亦表示反對。九月之後，國民黨與親民黨決定杯葛預算，自此藍綠陣營陷入纏鬥。在民進黨於立法院全面動員與美國在台協會拜訪若干泛藍陣營要員後，二〇〇三年一月，該項預算終於被有條件地通過，而條件是國防部必須去向美方議價，讓總價減少百分之十五。¹⁹

The KIDD procurement triggered inter- or even intra-service rivalry, and, later, a head-on confrontation in the Legislative Yuan. In April 2001, an Opposition legislator disclosed twelve deficiencies (some of them containing confidential material were deliberately leaked out from the military) of the KIDD and argued the MND should not buy these useless giants. The voice of objection soon spread out. In June, the MND announced that the procurement of KIDD would not be put in the next fiscal (2002) budget bill so the Navy could find more time to persuade the legislators. In April 2002, the admirals explained Navy's stance on KIDD procurement for legislators' supports. It failed again; and the Navy was called "the last prodigal left in the world." Meanwhile, the urge for saving KIDD budget to continue the request for AEGIE-equipped ships also emerged. In June, a computer simulation conducted in Han Kang exercise revealed that all four KIDD would be sank under the PLA's determined attack. This finding was purposely leaked out again. Even the Chairman of the People First Party (PFP) came against the KIDD program. After Kuomintang (KMT) and PFP decided to boycott the KIDD budget in September, a dogfighting confrontation between two camps ensued. After DPP's total mobilization in the Legislative Yuan and the American Institute in Taiwan paid a visit with key members in Pan-Blue camp, the KIDD budget was ultimately sanctioned in January 2003 with one condition – the MND was required to negotiate for a 15% discount with the US.¹⁹

紀德艦案是陳水扁政府在二〇〇〇年至二〇〇四年間第一（也是唯一）個業已經立法院通過的大型軍事採購案。作為二〇〇一年軍售清單中在國內接受立法院檢

驗的第一個案子，本案歷經了相當複雜的政治角力過程。朝野對於各種權衡的偏好與認知的不同，使得本案在國會的討論似乎是熱情高過於理性。冗長的政治角力，使得陳政府為此承受了許多的美方責難，陳總統告訴來訪的美國在台協會前主席卜睿哲：「對於軍售的時間表與優先順序，我們內部有許多不同意見。」²⁰但與以往國民黨時代的軍事採購案不同之處在於，相較以往為求迅速完成採購，所慣用的黑箱作業或粗魯的表決，在此案中很明顯地降低，這可能是因為民進黨自始便反對這種威權作法，或者國會的結構使得他們根本無法這樣作。海軍幾乎孤軍奮戰了二年的時間，鮮少有其它部會或友軍幫得上忙。這對於海軍聯絡官而言，是場「很有挫折感的夢魘」。²¹然而，故事才剛剛開始，更具複雜度的潛艦案正等著他們。

During 2000-2004, the KIDD program was the first (and the only) large procurement in Chen's Administration being sanctioned by the Legislative Yuan. As the first case of 2001 arms package being reviewed in the Legislative Yuan, the KIDD program experienced a very complex process of political struggle. The differences between two camps over preferences and perceptions of various trade-offs made the discussions in the Legislative Yuan seemingly passionate rather than rational ones. Given prolonged political tug-of-war in the KIDD program, the DDP government received considerable criticism from the US counterparts. President Chen told Richard Bush, the former Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, "We have differences of opinions about the timetable for the delivery of US arms and on which weapons should receive priority."²⁰ The procedure of the KIDD program was significantly different from those procurements in KMT era. In the past, in order to complete acquisition as soon as possible, the KMT used to operate in secrecy or put to a vulgar vote. But in the KIDD program, such approaches are denied either because the DPP disgusted such authoritarian manners outright or because Chen's minority government does not have such luxury. During the past two years, the Navy fought this uphill battle alone without significant assistances from other civilian sectors or military services. For ROCN liaison officers, it was a "frustrated nightmare."²¹ However, the story is just beginning. A more complicated case for submarine procurement is now waiting for them.

策略與焦點

Strategies and Focuses

從語意的觀點來看，變革有很多種不同的分類與途徑。以變革的分類來講，在光譜的一端，「精進式」的變革乃指精益求精，代表對既有架構的肯定，並藉少許的改變來強化此一架構。再來，是「累進式的調整」，乃對於策略、結構或管理流程的明顯改變，但沒有激進到可被稱為策略性轉變。在光譜的另一極端，則是所謂的「轉型式」的變革，這種改變在改變、推翻既有的架構，並提議一套對組織成員而言嶄新的角色、任務與策略。一般認為：創新、轉型或軍事事務革命在性質上都屬於此一激烈改變現狀的變革。依轉型的規模又可分為「模組式的轉型」與「全體式轉型」，（或稱戰略性變革）前者指部門或部分的轉型，後者事組織整體的大規模轉型。²²

From linguistic perspective, changes have various different types and approaches. As to the types of changes, "fine-tuning" change, on one extreme of the spectrum, is

aimed at doing better what is already done well. Next, “incremental adjustment” involves distinct modifications to strategies, structures, and management process, but not radical enough to be described as strategic. It appreciates existing frame of reference and intends to strengthen it by some mirror changes. On the other extreme, the purpose of so-called “transformation” change is to alter and overthrow the existing frame of reference by proposing another set of role, missions, or strategies that being novel to members in the organization. Most authors view such innovation, transformation, or revolution in military affairs (RMA) as this kind of radical change from status quo. In terms of scale of transformation, two types of transformation could be further identified: “modular transformation” and “corporate transformation (or strategic change)”. The former refers to a transformation that confines to departments or divisions while the later means a transformation throughout the organization.²²

以變革的途徑來講，有二種粗略的分類。第一種分法是以推動改變的主事者區分，有「由上而下」與「由下而上」的改變途徑。「由上而下」的變革途徑代表一種指令型／強制型的變革管理。指令型涉及使用權威來達成變革的決定；而強制型則是資深領導強制施加改革的構想。這種由上而下的變革途徑強調政軍的領導統御來設定改革基調，然後促使軍隊加以接受。相反的，由下而上的變革途徑強調一種協力／諮商的變革管理。協力型由廣泛的參與來決定會影響成員組織或實務的重大決定；諮商型則是就個人權責相關範圍有限地參與改革的決策。由下而上的變革途徑強調藉由組織學習的過程獲得集體認同的結果所形成的軍官團對改革之接受度。²³

As to the approaches of changes, there exist two rough categories: The first one set is “top-down” vs. “bottom-up” approaches in terms of change agents. A top-down orientation presents a directive-coercive style of reform management. A directive style involves the use of authority in reaching decisions about reform whereas a coercive orientation means senior leadership forcing, or imposing, a reform idea. The top-down orientation focuses on the leadership, civilian or military, which sets tone of reform and then drives the military to accept it. In contrast, a bottom-up orientation portrays a collaborative-consultative style of reform management. A collaborative style entails widespread participation in key decisions that affect their organization and practice whereas a consultative one means limited involvement in deciding a reform relevant to specific actors’ spheres of responsibility. The bottom-up orientation stresses the acceptance of a reform coming from officer corps especially through the process of organizational learning or by the result of collective identity.²³

第二種區分（帶有些本體論的意涵）為：規劃途徑與突現途徑。規劃途徑認為組織變更本質上是理性的規劃過程。就他們的觀點變革是可控制與預期的。「規劃性變革與常識、長期勤敏的工作、有系統的目標導向途徑與對於組織動力及變革方法的有效知識等相關。」²⁴而突現的變革途徑則假定變革是組織因應所處的環境變化而試圖一再校準過程，此一過程是持續性的、開放型的與無法預測的。持突現途徑變革者認為此一途徑較能適用於處於混沌環境下的現代化組織，不像規劃性變革，他們的重點是擺在組織調適其內部行為以適應外在環境。此外，他們也認為變革是不同團體為保全或增進其利益而相互競爭的政治過程。這一派的觀點特別重視下面三點：（一）變革的相互關連性；（二）變革的環境與行動相互形塑；（三）變革的多

成因、非線性之特質。概括的說，突現途徑說傾向採取由下而上而非由上而下的方式來進行變更。²⁵

The second category -- has some ontological implications -- is “planned approach” vs. “emergent approach”. The planned approach believes that organization change by its nature is a rational planning process. Reform, in their views, is both controllable and predictable. “Planned change involves common sense, hard work applied diligently over time, a systematic, goal-oriented approach, and valid knowledge about organization dynamic and how to change them.”²⁴ The emergent approach to changes starts from the assumption that a change is a continuous, open-ended and unpredictable process of aligning and re-aligning an organization to its changing environment. Advocates of emergent change argue that it is more suitable to the turbulent environment in which modern organization now operate because, unlike the planned approach, it recognizes that it is vital for organizations to adapt their internal practices and behavior to changing external conditions. Furthermore, it see change as a political process whereby different groups in an organization struggle to protect or enhance their own interests. The emergent school in particular emphasizes (1) the interconnectedness of change over time, (2) how the context of change shapes and is shaped by action, and (3) the multi-causal and non-linear nature of change. Generally, the emergent school is the move to adopt a bottom-up rather than top-down approach to initiating and implementing change.²⁵

但突現途徑並非放牛吃草，其精義如下：²⁶

◎ 幹練的經理人不會以零碎的方式進行策略性的管理。他們對於要作什麼、要達到什麼地方有清楚的認識。因此，目標是明確的。

◎ 但是達到目的地的路徑，也就是策略，一開始並未完全明確。幹練的經理人知道他所面臨的環境是不確定與模糊的。因此，對於達成目標的方法，他會保持彈性與開放。

◎ 由組織裡權力重要性不同、資訊管道與需求不同的人、時間迫切性與個別利益不同的人，在這些不同類型的人之間的互動中演現出策略來。而這些不同的壓力，由資深經理人巧妙地加以協調。而高階經理人則不斷進行評估、整合與組織。

◎ 策略以小的、累進的、善用機會的方式逐漸產生。因為已有既定目標且有高階經理人隨時進行情勢評估，此一演進並非是零碎的或是隨意的。這是這種累進式行動的邏輯。

◎ 其結果是組織覺得它是正在邁向已知的目標，並在行進間善用每個機會學習。

However, emergent is not random. Its essence is as the following:²⁶

-- Effective managers do not manage strategically in a piecemeal manner. They have a clear view of what they want to achieve, where they are trying to take the business. The destination is thus intended.

-- But the route to that destination, the strategy itself, is not intended from the start in any comprehensive way. Effective managers know that the environment they have to operate in is uncertain and ambiguous. They therefore sustain flexibility by holding open the method of reaching the goal.

-- The strategy itself then emerges from the interaction between different groupings of people in the organization, different groupings with different amounts of power, different requirements for and access to information, different time spans and parochial interest. These different pressures are orchestrated by senior managers. The top is always reassessing, integrating and organizing.

-- The strategy emerges or evolves in small incremental, opportunistic steps. But such evolution is not piecemeal or haphazard because of the agreed purpose and the role of top management in reassessing what is happening. It is this that provides the logic in the incremental action.

-- The result is an organization that is felling its way to a known goal, opportunistically learning as it goes.

最後，作者儘量不去用革命或演進這兩個詞。我們要注意：明顯的變革依舊可以採取演進的步伐來達成。許多學者認為要根本地改變既有的軍事體制參照架構的最好方法是演進式的。即便像是軍事事務革命般的明顯變革也不是能在短暫時間可以達成。歷史學者認為：即使在被認為可以加速軍事事務革命的戰爭狀態，多數的軍事事務革命仍然需要極長的時間去發展。二十世紀承平時期的軍事事務革命通常需要一、二十年的光陰。由於它的成效要如此之久才會顯現出來，使得軍事事務「革命」一詞備受爭議。²⁷

Finally, the author refrains from using the terms of evolution or revolution. It is important to note that significant change could be achieved by evolutionary pace. Most scholars often acknowledged the evolutionary way as the best possible way to accomplish the goal of fundamental change of existing system or fame of reference that deeply embedded in military institution. A significant change such as RMA does not happen in an instant. Historians believed that “even in war – the most powerful accelerating force conceivable – most [RMAs] take considerable time to develop. Twentieth-century peacetime RMAs have sometimes required decades, and delays of that magnitude have inevitably led to argument over the appropriateness of the term *revolutionary*.”²⁷

陳水扁總統在一九九九年競選期間提出《國防政策白皮書》，在這份報告中，他提出了許多國防改革的訴求：(一) 在國防組織上，要朝向扁平化發展，以縮減指揮層級，並要確立軍政軍令一元化與文官統制的精神。(二) 在軍事戰略方面：應從守勢防禦向攻勢防禦進行調整，揚棄灘岸決戰的構想，以癱瘓戰取代消耗戰。(三) 在軍備整備方面，依決戰境外的戰爭指導原則，積極籌建源頭打擊力量，優先強化海空軍軍力，建立三軍聯合作戰能力，積極發展電子資訊作戰能量，健全 C4ISR 系統整合，並鼓勵軍民科技合作。(四) 在人力政策方面：推動兵力結構合理化，減縮常備役期，確保高素質人力並建立專業化軍隊。(五) 在全民防衛方面，要強化全民危機意識，建立全民自救救人之能量。其目標為：「推動國防現代化的轉型工程，以確保台灣至二十一世紀維持足夠的防衛能力」。²⁸

During the period of presidential campaign in 1999, President Chen put forward many proposals for defense reform in his *White Paper on Defense Policy*. He promised: (1) To streamline the defense organization, to trim down the chain of command, and to ensure the integration of military command and administration systems and the principles of civilian control; (2) In the aspect of military strategy, to adjust current pure defense to offensive defense, to abandon the operational concept of “annihilate enemy at the water’s edge”, and to replace attrition warfare by paralyze warfare; (3) In war preparation, based upon the principles of conducting war – “decisive battle outside the territory”, Taiwan should actively seek to establish a capability to attack the enemy at source, prioritize the Navy and Air Force, build up a joint operation capability, develop information operations capability, strengthen the integration of C4ISR systems, and encourage technological cooperation between private and military sectors; (4) As to personnel policy, to optimize proper force structure, reduce the service term of conscription, establish high-quality and professional armed forces; (5) To implement the concept of all-out defense by solidifying population’s will to resist enemy and a full-dimensional protection from emergency. In short, the paper concluded the overall goal was *to engineer the transformation for a modernized defense in order to ensure Taiwan’s sufficient defense capability into the 21st century*.²⁸

從提議的項目與變革的幅度來看，可以肯定的是這些建議傳遞出一個台灣國防需要架構轉型式變革的承諾。舉例來講，陳總統明白地提出創新的作戰概念——「境外決戰」，並講明要揚棄當時主流的灘岸決戰準則，影響所及是整個軍事戰略、兵力結構與武器採購都將受到連帶變化。誠如前述，再怎麼立意良善的「改革」也有徹底失敗的可能，除非改革的理念能有說服力並被順利地擴散出去，除非改革的措施能有技巧地管理並被全心全意的執行下去。總統陳水扁於二〇〇〇年就任總統後，在原有的承諾之後，就是說服、擴散、管理與執行的技巧與努力了。

Considering both the substance and rate of change, President Chen’s proposals conveyed a commitment for a transformation change for Taiwan’s defense. For example, President Chen clearly put forward an innovative operational concept – “decisive battle outside territory” – and declared to discard the dominant doctrine of “annihilate enemy at the water’s edge.” Such an initiative will surely register a chain of sequential changes such as military strategy, force structure, and even arms procurement. As we mentioned above, a well-intentioned reform still could fail unless reform ideas are convincing and smoothly diffused, unless reform undertakings are skillful managed and full-heartedly implemented. After President Chen took his office in 2000, the test was the skill and efforts for persuasion, diffusion, management, and implementation to support his initial commitments.

從一個後見之明的角度來看：陳總統就任之後並沒有固定的國防改革策略，這是因為在朝野對抗升高後，可以操作規劃途徑的變革策略之時空條件幾乎消失殆盡。只有在少數場合為設定議題，象徵性地使用由上而下的變革方式。平常，陳總統採取廣泛的授權並鼓勵由下而上的變革。一個較為常態的變革策略是陳總統對於有關於人的政策極為重視：「三安政策」的推動對於基層軍士官兵士氣有所幫助。在高階將領的拔擢上，升遷管道較為暢通，年輕而專業的將領在這幾年間增加不少，

據估計在這四年間為陳總統所晉升的將領比例可達將領總人數的四分之三。²⁹ 相對的，國防部本身為了降低變革的風險與不確定性，在二〇〇三年的春季，為了緩和文人學者所提的軍事事務革命所帶來的大幅變動之意涵，甚至自創了「軍事事務革新」一語。

In hindsight, President Chen did not adopt a fixed strategy for defense reform after his inauguration. It was because the contextual conditions to operate a planned approach sharply declined after a head-on confrontation with the Opposition. Meanwhile, except few occasions when a top-down approach used symbolically for setting agenda, most of the time, President Chen broadly delegated and encouraged bottom-up initiatives for reform. One relative constant pattern in President Chen's reform undertakings is his attention on policy for people. "Three Assurance Policy" is helpful for the morale of rank and file. In promotion of high rank officers, the promotion path is much open than ever. Many young and professional officers got their stars during the past four years. One estimated the number of top military officials promoted by Chen accounted for more than three-quarters of the total number of officials in the end of 2003.²⁹ Respectively, the MND, for reducing the risk and uncertainty associated with defense reform, created a new wording of "evolution in military affairs" in order to moderate the implication of revolutionary change and to placate those felt to be targeted by a RMA approach proposed by civilian scholars.

國會的對抗與少數政府的窘境，大大降低在國防改革上採取較為風險的策略。由於這樣的限制，一些需要直接面臨國會或需動支大額預算的改革措施，特別是立法委員感到非常興趣的武器採購，在面臨到國會繁瑣的詰問與質疑，顯得十分吃力。在這裡，為求政治的穩定似乎是項極為關鍵的考量。雖然，國會的壓力使得不熟悉政治複雜性的將領們吃盡苦頭，然而，弔詭的是，國會在國防決策上影響力的加大與國防政策更為公開透明，實際上也是民進黨在野時所一再追求的改革措施。

The dilemmas caused by conflicts in Legislative Yuan and minority government largely reduced the capacity of risk-taking. Under such constraints, those reform undertakings that required legislators' consensus or large budget -- especially those arms procurements which legislators were interested in -- encountered serious drawback. Here, the consideration of political stability seems critical. Although the political complexity pressed hard on those generals and admirals in Legislative Yuan; however, paradoxically enough, both the increase of legislators' influences on defense policy-making and a more transparent defense policy-making were reform appeals that DPP proposed when in the Opposition.

在其他領域上，特別是能夠躲開立法院政治糾纏的領域，情勢大不相同。許多重要的改革措施正蓬勃發展開來。有些甚至可以用激進來形容。為了推動聯合作戰的文化，國防部提出三個基礎軍官學校在二〇〇七年簡併為一個軍官大學，便是其中極具挑戰性的計畫。有些計畫則具有深遠的戰略意涵，像是陸軍擬議釋出其飛彈部隊，成立一個獨立的飛彈軍種。在這些計畫裡，一般所認為會牽制軍事變革的軍種利益反而讓位於前瞻性的改革理念。

The situations were dramatically different in other areas where the MND can escape from political muddle-through in Legislative Yuan. Many substantial reform undertakings are lively emerging. Some can even be described as radical. For example, in order to prompt a culture for jointness, the MND proposed a rather ambitious scheme to integrate three basic military academies into a single university in 2007.³⁰ Some may have profound strategic implications: ROC Army, for example, was reported studied the possibility to release its missile units for establishing an independent missile service. In these schemes, parochial (service) interests, what are considered as the most significant obstacles for reform, seemingly gave way to the advanced innovative ideas.

或許最佳的成就來自於建立國家化與專業化的軍隊上。雖然，在民主化的運動之中，台灣的軍隊在九〇年代便已逐漸脫離黨派色彩，但考慮到幾乎所有的高階軍官都是國民黨黨員而且接受長年的反台獨份子的教條，二〇〇〇年被認為傾向台獨的陳水扁當選總統後，軍隊立即無條件的宣示效忠三軍統帥並接受民主選舉結果的表現仍然是可觀的成就。過去四年間，在《國防法》的基礎上，軍隊的角色持續地專業化，軍隊中立的原則持續地體制化（甚至有時中立到被認為政治魯鈍），在在顯示，軍隊正密切回應著現今台灣的社會環境外，堅定地邁向建立一支堪任的戰鬥武力。

Perhaps the most remarkable achievement comes from the establishment of nationalize and professional armed forces. The armed forces were gradually getting rid of KMT affiliation during Taiwan's democratization in 90s. But, considering nearly all high rank officers being KMT members and being indoctrinated to fight against advocates of Taiwan independence, it was an outstanding accomplishment that the military immediately and unconditionally announced its loyalty to new President and obeyed the election result after Shui-Bian Chen, who being perceived a pro-independence advocate, won the presidential campaign in 2000. In the past four years, based upon *National Defense Law*, the role and mission of Taiwan's armed forces kept on professionalizing, the principle of disengagement from politics kept institutionalizing – even to the degree that being regarded as apolitical. All demonstrates that Taiwan's armed forces not only respond the broad societal environment that it finds itself in but also determine to develop a capable, professional fighting force.

結論

Conclusion

儘管政治上的不可能使得台灣在變革策略的選項上受到限制，但現今政軍領導階層以突現途徑，利用機會，創造環境，仍然在許多意欲變革的項目上，達成可觀的成就。這種由下而上與突現的途徑，對於習慣於接受明確指令的軍人而言，或許有些生疏。但從許多前述許多跡象顯示，許多富想像力的軍官正努力擺脫制度與系統面上的束縛，在許多領域中達成區部的變革。

Although political impossibility limits the possible range of available options for

reform, civilian and military leaderships adopt emergent approach -- to grasp every opportunity, to shape the environment -- achieve considerable progress in many desired reform initiatives. For many officers who being used to take and follow the order, this bottom-up, emergent approach looks unfamiliar. But observing from the above-mentioned innovative schemes, many imaginative soldiers try to outflank the institutional and systematic constraints and score some local successes in defense reform.

這種變革不是全套，但卻是累進的；不是迅速的，但卻是堅定的。考慮到種種不同權衡所構成的複雜度後，此一途徑在不犧牲改革願景之下、不危及脆弱的政治環境、不引起軍隊不滿的情形下可行的解決方案。而事實上，在某種程度上，它也蠻成功的。■

This kind of reform is not a wholesale one, but incremental; it is not speedy, but steady. Considering complexity caused by the interconnection among various trade-offs, this approach is a viable solution without precipitating a fragile political situation or major upheaval in the military, or without being forced to abandon the reform vision. In fact, to some extent, it works. ■

註釋

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 - ¹¹ Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation in Organizations," p. 122.
 - ¹² See Chui-Cheng Chiu, "The Construction and Deployment of China's Economic Absorption Strategies toward Taiwan under the WTO," in **Taiwan Defense Affairs**, Vol. 3, No.3 (2003). The Author argued (see p. 21) the purpose of China's economic absorption is to "cultivate pro-China groups and isolate the Taiwanese government. With this strategical operation, China can not only improve its government's permeation into Taiwanese industries, but also create contradiction and problems between the Taiwanese civilian and authorities. Thus, it softens Taiwanese insistence on its sovereignty."

- ¹³ **United Daily News**, September 30, 2003, p. 13.
- ¹⁴ Michael D. Swaine and James C. Mulvenon, **Taiwan's Foreign and Defense Policies: Features and Determinants** (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), p.78.
- ¹⁵ **Financial Times**, March 30, 2000. Quoted from Peter Richard, "Civil-Military Relations in the Republic of China: A Conceptual Approach to Evaluating the Stability of Taiwan Civil-Military Dialogue," **E-Journal of the Center for the Study of Democracy**, Vol.1 (2002), p. 27.
- ¹⁶ David Shambaugh, **Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects** (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 329.
- ¹⁷ ROC MND, **National Defense Report 2002**, p.55.
- ¹⁸ See Martin Edmonds and York W. Chen, "Assessment of the ROCN's Modernization: Views from Strategic and Operational Consideration," **Taiwan Defense Affairs**, Vol.2, No.2.
- ¹⁹ **United Evening News**, April 25, 2001, p.2; **Taiwan News**, June 20, 2001, p.2; **Central Daily News**, April 25, 2002, p.4; **United Evening News**, May 17, 2002, p.7; **China Times**, June 29, 2002, p.4; **United Daily News**, June 3, 2002, p.2; **China Times**, September 8, 2002, p.4; **China Daily News**, September 12, 2002, p.5; **China Times**, October 16, 2002, p.6; **Central Daily News**, October 17, 2002, p.5; **China Times**, November 2, 2002, p.4; **China Times**, March 27, 2003, p.4.
- ²⁰ **Taipei Times**, February 26, 2003, p.3.
- ²¹ Interview with a ROCN Captain, December, 2003.
- ²² Andrzej Huczynski and David Buchman, **Organizational Behaviour: An Introductory Text** (Essex: Financial Times/Prentice Hall, 1985, reprinted 2001), p. 606.; Barbara Senior, **Organizational Change** (Essex: Financial Times/Prentice Hall, 1997, reprinted 2000), pp. 39-40.; Michael L. Tushman, W. H. Newman, and E. Romanelli, "Convergence and Upheaval: Managing the Unsteady Pace of Organizational Evolution," in Michael L. Tushman and William L. Moore edited, **Readings in the Management of Innovation** (New York: Ballinger, 1988), pp. 712-713.
- ²³ Huczynski and Buchman, **Organizational Behaviour**, p. 606. The former (top-down orientation) vein can be seen in Barry R. Posen, **The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars** (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), while the latter (bottom-up orientation) is the main theme of Emily O. Goldman, "Mission Possible: Organizational Learning in Peacetime," in Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman, and Edward Rhodes edited, **The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests** (New York: Columbia University, 1999).
- ²⁴ Wendell L. French and Cecil H. Bell, **Organization Development: Behavioral Science Intervention for Organization Improvement** (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), pp.1-2.
- ²⁵ Bernard Burnes, **Managing Change: A Strategic Approach to Organizational Dynamics** (Essex: Pearson Education, 2000), pp. 280-284.
- ²⁶ Ralph D. Stacey, **Strategic Management and Organizational Dynamics: The Challenge of Complexity** (London: Financial Times, 2000), p.92.
- ²⁷ Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, "Thinking about Revolutions in Warfare," in MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray edited, **The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050** (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 12.
- ²⁸ Commanding Center for Shui-Bian Chen Presidential Campaign, **Shui-Bian Chen's Blueprint for Sate: Vol.1 National Security** (Taipei: Commanding Center for Shui-Bian Chen Presidential Campaign, 1999), pp. 49-51.
- ²⁹ **Taipei Times**, December 23, 2003, p.8
- ³⁰ See ROC MND website: www.mnd.gov.tw