

行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫成果報告

生活世界、文化差異與奠基理念

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計畫主持人：游淙祺

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一、中文摘要

本研究從現象學的角度思考生活世界與文化差異的問題。我在此研究中首先提出如下問題：文化差異的存在是生活世界的不同所造成的嗎？或者文化間的差異必須仰賴生活世界作為共同基礎才得以清楚說明？前一個提問方式意味世界上存在著不同的生活世界，每一個生活世界都有其文化特質；後一個提問方式則蘊含世界上存在著唯一的生活世界，而且是基礎性的生活世界。在現象學的思路中胡塞爾與舒茲可以說分別代表兩種不同的思考模式，本研究便是以他們兩人的理論作為出發點對生活世界與文化差異的關係進行探討，而且特別凸顯「奠基理念」作為思考問題的主軸。

關鍵詞：

生活世界、文化差異、胡塞爾、舒茲、瓦登斐爾斯

Abstract

The problem of cultural difference, combined with the notion of lifeworld, is to be inquired phenomenologically in this research. The central question is raised as follows: is cultural difference the result of differences between lifeworlds or conversely the explication of cultural difference depends upon the lifeworld that is common to all? Different ways of understanding the lifeworld notion result in different conceptions of cultural difference. In phenomenology Husserl and Schutz represent these two different positions respectively. My research aims at clarifying the relationship between lifeworld and cultural difference primarily according to Husserl, Schutz, their critics

and reflections on them, whereby I will stress the idea of grounding (*die Grundlegungsidee*) as clue to my investigation.

Keywords:

Lifeworld, Cultural Difference, Husserl, Schutz, Waldenfelds

二、緣由與目的

世界上存在著各種不同的文化，而文化間彼此有所差異乃是自明的事實，若將此一事實與現象學的概念——生活世界關連起來，則我們可以提出如下的問題：文化差異的存在是生活世界的不同所造成的嗎？或者文化間的差異必須仰賴生活世界作為共同基礎才得以清楚說明？前一個提問方式意味世界上存在著不同的生活世界，每一個生活世界都有其文化特質；後一個提問方式則蘊含世界上存在著唯一的生活世界，而且是基礎性的生活世界。

對生活世界的不同理解可以說造就了不同的文化差異觀點。在現象學的思路中胡塞爾與舒茲可以說分別代表兩種不同的思考模式。本研究便是以他們兩人的理論作為出發點對生活世界與文化差異的關係進行探討，而且特別凸顯「奠基理念」作為思考問題的主軸。

在《歐洲學術危機》一書中胡塞爾之所以提出「生活世界」的概念主要有三個目的：1. 指出近代以來所發展的「客觀科學」，特別是自然科學的基礎在於生活世界，藉此以克服客觀主義所帶來的弊病；2. 指出唯有超驗現象學可以闡明

生活世界，因此生活世界可被視為進入超驗現象學的門徑；3. 指出生活世界是所有不同歷史文化世界的共同根基，藉此獲得瞭解各個歷史文化世界的涵蓋性角度。值得注意的是，胡塞爾在該書中所使用的「生活世界」概念是有歧義的，它有時指涉具體的生活世界如某個人的生活周遭；有時指具有特殊文化的領域例如青少年的次文化所塑造的世界；最後也指必須透過抽象活動的過程才被認識到的「世界核心」，它也就是所有人都会認可的素樸知覺世界，所謂的素樸意指它尚未經過文化的解釋或重構。在這三個不同的涵義中，只有第三個可以滿足上面所提到的三個目的，亦即嚴格言之，胡塞爾的生活世界概念指的就是那個共通於所有人經驗的領域。就這點而言，生活世界是沒有文化差異的，甚至我們可以反過來說，文化差異的問題必須預設共同的生活世界才得以說明清楚，因為不同的文化無非就是對這個共同世界的不同解釋。如此看來，胡塞爾的生活世界理論可以說被「奠基理念」(die Idee der Grundlegung) 所支配。

所謂的「奠基理念」是由當代德國學者 Bernhard Waldenfels 所提出的，「奠基」意指「回溯到最終基礎或最後原因」(Rückgang auf ein Fundament bzw. letzte Gründe)。他指出整個西方哲學可以說都被此一理念所支配，而試圖去追尋最後的真實。胡塞爾生活世界概念的提出在 Waldenfels 看來無非也是此一傳統影響下的產物。

近來備受討論的胡塞爾概念「我群世界」(Heimwelt) 與「他群世界」(Fremdwelt) 可以提供我們對生活世界與文化差異問題的思考多一些角度。胡塞爾有關「我群世界」與「他群世界」的論述散落在 Intersubjektivität 第三冊 (Hua XV) 當中。「我群世界」意味「我的同胞」的正常生活世界。所謂「正常」乃是傳統的產物，也就是說經由世代積累而成。「世代性」(Generativität) 可以說是胡塞爾論述「我群世界」與「他群世界」時的核心概念，所謂的「他群世界」無非就是與我沒有共同傳統沒有同

一祖先的人 (Hua XV: 431f.)。既然傳統與歷史構成了文化的特質，我們因此未嘗不能說，「我群世界」與「他群世界」之間的差異就是文化上的差異。胡塞爾是怎麼看這種文化上的差異？他認為這種差異是可以被克服的，對此他提出了「一個世界」(die eine Welt) 這個概念。根據當代德國現象學學者 Klaus Held 的解釋，胡塞爾對「一個世界」的構成之說明與他在《笛卡爾沉思錄》中處理「互為主體性」的構成是相類似的。如同他人的心理活動及主體是透過身體被我間接的確認，同樣地，其他文化世界的先人也是透過對我而言自明的生與死現象間接被確認。換言之，「世代性」可以說是建立了一座銜接文化與文化的橋樑。

理論上，「一個世界」與不同的「我群世界」之間的關係猶如意向對象的「同一端」(Identitätspol) 與不同的「面向」(Abschattungen) 之間的關係。既然各種「面向」的綜合基礎在於這個對象的「同一端」，這個「一個世界」也就可說在不同的「我群世界」中表現出來。另外，既然意向對象的「同一端」是一個只能夠透過理念化才能得到的理念，所以「一個世界」也同樣是理念。從歷史來看，世界作為理念最早出現在古希臘，當時的哲學及科學推動了這樣的理念之出現。這個理念深深的影響了近代歐洲的思想並且在近代歷史中獲得部分的實現。所有的人類可說都分享了這「一個世界」的理念，可說都在同一個具有普遍規範的「我群世界」中。縱使這個「新世界」還處在發展階段，胡塞爾卻認為它的全然實現是應該的。換句話說，文化間的差異乃是所有人類都應該克服的對象。在胡塞爾注重文化普遍性的情況下，我們可以說文化差異的現象在胡塞爾並未得到真正的重視。

舒茲在一九三〇年代便已接觸到胡塞爾的「生活世界」概念，但是他所關懷的問題畢竟與胡塞爾有所不同，所以對「生活世界」也有著不同的理解。生活世界對他而言乃是具有社會文化特質的實踐領域。如果說每個生活世界都有

自己的文化特質，則不同的生活世界彼此之間免不了便是有著文化上的差異。

舒茲借用胡塞爾的概念「附現」

(Appräsentation) 來說明文化差異的問題。任何一個生活世界的經驗在他看來都是建立在「附現指涉」(appräsentative Verweisung) 之上。換言之超越任何文化差異的素樸生活世界經驗(如胡塞爾所言)是不存在的。任何經驗少不了都具有文化性特別是評價性的意涵。同一個社群的人基本上可說都具有相同的「附現指涉」系統，任何不熟悉這個系統的人便被視為外來者或陌生人。文化差異的概念基本上可以說是融入在舒茲的生活世界概念當中。

不過舒茲並沒有放棄追求「共同的生活世界」作為所有不同生活世界之基礎。當他提出「普遍象徵論」(universal symbolism) 時，我們便可以明顯地看出這一點。他雖然不像胡塞爾追求未遭任何文化影響的素樸知覺經驗，卻追求共同於所有人的文化經驗，特別是一些象徵性的經驗，諸如以上為尊，以下為卑等等。

如果 Waldenfels 對胡塞爾的批評是成立的，則我們未嘗不能主張舒茲在生活世界的理論上少不了亦受到「奠基理念」的影響。換言之，儘管舒茲在文化差異與生活世界的關係之看法上與胡塞爾有所不同，兩人在奠基理念上卻趨於一致。

Waldenfels 在批評胡塞爾被奠基理念所影響時，同時也反對以奠基理念為基礎思考生活世界的問題。他認為，素樸的生活世界經驗不過是一種意義建構，何以說相對於其他的意義建構諸如各種文化建構它具有優先性？個人認為，這個批評也適用在舒茲的理論上，因為舒茲同樣也意圖將某個意義建構當作最根本的，它是各個不同文化世界的根基，甚至還是其他意義建構如科學、宗教或藝術等的基礎。

Waldenfels 「反奠基理念」的想法，對於生活世界與文化差異的關係有何特殊的意義？亦即對於「究竟文化差異是

不同的生活世界所造成，抑或文化差異必須依賴生活世界才得以說明」這個問題能提供比較好的說明嗎？Waldenfels 想避免相對論(不同的生活世界造就文化差異)和絕對論(生活世界是各個文化世界的基礎)的兩極化主張。在他看來，回答這個問題不是在兩者之間作選擇，因為這兩種思考方式都忽略掉一個更根本的問題，就是「他者性」(Fremdheit) 的問題。過去歐洲人與其他文化接觸時，最大的弊病在於未能持平的瞭解其他文化，更遑論平等的對待其他文化，也就是犯了「歐洲中心主義」

(Eurozentrismus) 的弊病。Waldenfels 從胡塞爾的「我群世界」、「他群世界」等概念來思考這個問題，他指出胡塞爾一方面指出「我群世界」和「他群世界」之間存在著差異，但另一方面卻又藉由「一個世界」來泯除兩者間的差異。此「一個世界」既是首要的基礎(erster Grund) 又是最終的視域(letzter Horizont)，而且確立它的手段乃是理性。歐洲對於胡塞爾來說無非就是這個理性的化身，也是具有普遍性的一般世界之前衛者(Vorhut einer Gemeinwelt)，因為歐洲已經為所有文化創立了規範與理念。以此規範為準，其他文化的成就可說都只是達到前理性、前邏輯或直接可說未成熟或原始的階段而已。在理性發展的歷史上，非歐洲人都應該向歐洲人看齊才是。Waldenfels 指出，歐洲中心主義乃是以犧牲「他者性」為手段所達到的全體性，這是歐洲文化發展過程中最大的盲點所在。Waldenfels 認為這個盲點應於改正。同樣的，奠基理念的思想方式也應該予以糾正。

如果我們接受 Waldenfels 「反奠基理念」的想法，並以此為基礎重新審視自胡塞爾及舒茲以來關於生活世界與文化差異之關係的問題會得出什麼樣的新觀點？文化普遍性還可以是一個有意義的問題嗎？Waldenfels 認為這仍是可能的，如果我們賦於普遍性以新的涵義。亦即不要把任何一個文化所建構出來的普遍性當作是唯一正確的可能性，也就

是說普遍性未嘗不可以是多元的。這個說法看似弔詭，然而卻讓我們更能夠回到普遍性的根源去，因為任何一個普遍性的建構都是在特定的文化中形成的，所以它免不了就帶有地區性。如果我們能夠接受一個地區所建構的普遍性，則為何就不能接受另一地區所建構的普遍性呢？如果我們認識到這一點，則我們自然就能避免究竟是他們或是我們所建構的才是真正的普遍性這樣的無謂爭論。

我認為，Waldenfels 的看法在全球化趨勢日益加深，各種文化互動頻繁的今天，是饒富意義的，因為他一方面回應了當代的文化現象，另一方面也對自己文化傳統中隱含的優越感提出批判。相對而言，胡塞爾和舒茲的觀點一方面建立在於今看來過時的文化經驗上，也就是世界上絕大部分的文化彼此間的互動不高，瞭解不深，另一方面則囿於奠基理念，所以有著自己的（歐洲）文化乃是其他文化之表率或全人類文化怎麼看怎麼相似的臆想。在我看來，全球化的意義不在於地球上的各個文化從此趨於一致，反而是，在彼此接觸機會增多，認識日深的情況下，更讓我們有機會也有必要去省思，存在彼此間的文化差異現象，它的意義究竟為何，而過去的思想家們在思考類似的問題時有著什麼樣的盲點存在。總之，在文化差異的相關問題上依然還存在著許多值得探討之處，現象學的學者如胡塞爾、舒茲和 Waldenfels 等人在這方面都已提出了相當多重要而發人深省的見解，後來的學者在既有的基礎上自當有更多的發揮，特別是出於不同文化背景的我們，在這個問題上更是可以有自己的見解和想法。本研究姑且以此自我期許作為結尾。

三、計畫成果自評：

本研究的成果主要在於對現象學的文化差異觀點作一番梳理的工作，並試從奠基理念的概念出發對胡塞爾及舒茲的相關論述作一番反省。這個工作的成果，

其意義主要在於提供思考文化差異問題的角度，缺憾之處則在於本人未能進一步試就我們文化的角度看相關的問題。但畢竟這是一條長遠的路，本人願將此次的研究成果當作將來相關研究的起步，期能針對文化差異現象構造一個屬於自己的觀點。

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附件(一): 出席國際學術會議心得報告:

本人此次參加在美國巴爾的摩所舉行的第四十屆現象學與人文科學(The Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences)年會及研討會,時間從 2001 年 10 月 4 日到 10 月 6 日,總共進行三天。除了第一天報到及歡迎儀式外,議程主要安排在第二及第三天。此次大會按照學者提供之論文設定幾個子題:例如“Tacit Understandings: Embodied Realities within Healthcare Practices”,“Technology and Education as Existential Bedfellows”,“The Socio-Ontological Difference and Equality”,“Exploring Professional Development: Understanding the Lived Time and Place of Teachers”,“Dwelling Together through Listening: Gathering Interpretive Insights for Nursing Education and Practice”,“Exploring the Ways in Which We Experience the World through Lived Human Relations: Social Issues”,“Teaching From the Heart: The Life-world of Relationality in the Classroom”,An Exploring of Lived Space as Healing Space”。除此之外,大會並安排了兩場特別介紹兩位當今在跨現象學與人文社會科學頗有成就的學者,加拿大 York 大學的 John O’neill,主題“Phenomenological Sociology”,來自美國 Notre Dame 大學的

Fred Dallmayr。討論主題“Alternative Visions: Recent Works of Fred Dallmayr”。由於這兩位資深的學者都在場即席回應,讓我對兩位豐富的學養及敬業的精神十分佩服。Dallmayr 教授在闡述他最近十五年來的近作時提到他為何會將注意力放在西方文化與其他文化之關係上尤其讓我留下深刻的印象。他批判西方人自我中心的態度,即便在所謂的「他者性」蔚為哲學風潮之時亦未曾改變。他身體力行,親自接觸印度等東方古文明,期能在認識瞭解其他文化之時,改變自己身上所繼承的西方中心態度。他的深刻反省和謙卑態度讓他對 911 事件後美國決定採取武力報復有所保留,他語重心長的指出,美國及西方應該在武力之外還有其他的選擇。

由於最近我的研究興趣放在文化差異問題上,聆聽 Dallmayr 教授的講演及

回應讓我頗感認同，也認識到將來對相關主題的研究，Dallmayr 教授的著作自然不可錯過。我當場表明，將來若有機會當邀他前來台灣，讓我有更多直接的學習機會。

本人此次所發表的論文就是本年度研究的成果。在“The Socio-Ontological Difference and Equality”子題之下我和日本早稻田大學社會學教授 Hisashi Nasu 和兩位美國學者一同發表，論文發表後，在場學者反應熱烈，針對 Nasu 教授的「平等」、「不平等」和我的「文化差異」或「文化共同性」提出問題或個人見解，我感受到美國學者十分關心他們國內的社會不平等以及國內或國際間不同社群文化上的差異現象。

此行另外的收穫在於會場所展示的書籍，雖然不見得都是最新的出版品，但還是能夠「意外地」發現到一些過去遺漏的著作，或者說過去不很重視的領域，這次藉著與作者面對面的接觸而引發起興趣，可說也是另外一種收穫。

附件（二）：出席國際學術會議論文
（2001/10/4-6, Baltimore, USA）

Lifeworld, Cultural Difference and the Idea of Grounding

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Introduction:

That there exist different cultures in the world is an indisputable fact. Relating this fact to the phenomenological concept of lifeworld we might raise two questions: Do we live in the same lifeworld despite cultural difference? Or else, do we live in different lifeworlds because of cultural difference? The first question implies the singularity of the lifeworld, whereas in the second question the lifeworld can be lifeworld only in the plural. How is cultural difference related to the lifeworld after all? For Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), the founder of phenomenology, the lifeworld seems to be conceived of as the bare ground of the natural sciences and therefore valid for all mankind regardless of cultural differences. In contrast, for Alfred Schutz (1899-1959), who is more concerned with the foundation of human and social sciences than that of natural sciences, the lifeworld involves cultural difference because he comprehends lifeworld as the field of praxis with social and cultural characteristics.

In the following I will inquire into the problem of the lifeworld and cultural difference in the context of Husserl's as well as Schutz's theories especially with regard to the idea of grounding (*Grundlegungsidee*) with which Bernhard Waldenfels (1934-) criticizes Husserl's lifeworld theory. (Waldenfels: 1985) My point of view is that in spite of the apparent difference between Husserl and Schutz they are both affected by the idea of grounding. I inquire into the consequences of the rejection of this idea in relation to the problematic of the lifeworld and cultural difference and in the end I reflect on the meaning of universality in the context of cultural difference.

I

The lifeworld is, in the transcendental

approach of Husserl, not the object of direct description, but something that has to be gained back by way of “asking back” (*Rückfrage*). This “asking back” has, according to Waldenfels, three goal

1. the grounding of the sciences in the lifeworld and the overcoming of the objectivism stemming from the natural sciences developed in the modern age;
2. the opening to transcendental phenomenology from the lifeworld, which is subjective-relative;
3. the acquiring of an encompassing perspective on different historical worlds, because all such worlds presuppose the one lifeworld.

The lifeworld thus fulfills three functions: the grounding function (*Bodenfunktion*), the guiding function (*Leitfadenfunktion*), and the uniting function (*Einigungsfunktion*).

But how is the lifeworld to be understood with respect to content?

Husserl has offered three versions of the lifeworld in the *Krisis*: a) the concrete lifeworld; b) a relative specific world such as vocational world or a certain cultural world; 3) a world-nucleus of nature to be distilled by abstraction, namely, the world of straightforward intersubjective perception. In his eyes only the third version can fulfill the three functions mentioned above. This world is composed of the world of space-time and natural objects, which are not yet culturally interpreted and reconstructed. Thus understood, this world represents that which remains the same for everyone despite cultural differences of whatever kind. Waldenfels stresses that this world is, on the one hand, given first (*erstgeben*) in the bare perceptual presence and on the other hand, functions as regulating principle (*letzttregelnd*) in the universal structuration. As “given first,” it is the ground of all meaning-constructions (*Sinnbildung*). As regulating principle, it is the horizon of all meaning constructions.¹

¹ Niklas Luhman treats this combination of ground and horizon as incompatible and confusing: “Einerseits heißt es, die Welt sei ein Horizont, eventuell Horizont aller Horizonte. Andererseits wird die Lebenswelt als der Boden beschrieben, auf dem

Accordingly, the lifeworld comprehended as ground means the ground of meaning constructs of higher levels; in particular those in the objective natural sciences, whereas the lifeworld understood as horizon means that from which we are conscious of something as given. It is namely the pre-given condition for the appearance of things.

So far as horizon is concerned, some explications need to be added. When we understand the horizon to be the pre-given condition for the appearance of things, this does not mean that it is background. A background is something that might turn to be the theme of our consciousness, whereas the horizon can never become definite or thematic. The horizon escapes so to speak substantial thematization. In this respect, the horizon is beyond the background. It is indeterminate. But indeterminacy does not mean infinity, because infinity can be applied to something which can itself become thematic, whereas indeterminacy can not. The world-infinity, Husserl contends, is peculiar to the “astronomical-physicalistic” infinity, i.e., the infinity of endlessness. Such conception of horizon does not apply to the horizon that Husserl understands to be the lifeworld. The lifeworld as horizon is indeterminate only in the sense that it is open to new possibilities. Certainly new possibilities happen only in a certain frame or a “leeway” (*Spielraum*), which can never be expanded endlessly.

Understood as horizon and as ground, the lifeworld is regarded as the indispensable foundation of the constructs in the science, those in the positivistic natural sciences. Besides, the lifeworld is understood primarily as the world of perception, which reveals itself as the common ground of all possible human experiences, or put in a different way, it

alles Beobachten und Handeln bewegt. Aber ein Horizont ist kein Boden. Auf einem Horizont kann man nicht stehen. Man kann sich auf ihn bewegen, nicht aber sich auf ihm bewegen.” Luhmann finds that both terms of ground (*Boden*) and horizon (*Horizont*) are metaphorical and “[d]as Unglück ist, daß Husserls Metaphern einander widersprechen.” (Luhman 1986:177)

goes beyond the boundaries of cultural differences. Husserl's conception of lifeworld is obviously guided by the idea of grounding.

Some recent discussions of Husserl's notions of homeworld (*Heimwelt*) and alienworld (*Fremdwelt*) have shed new light on his conception of the relation between lifeworld and cultural difference. The notion of homeworld, scattered around in *Intersubjektivität Band III (Husserliana XIV)*, indicates the normal lifeworld of the "homecomrades." The normality is the result of tradition, which formulates itself from generation to generation. Generativity (*Generativität*) is the key notion in the Husserlian descriptions both of homeworld and alienworld. The alienworld is thus understood as the world with which the homecomrades have no common tradition, i.e., no common forerunners through generations (Hua XV: 431f.). Since tradition and history shape cultural characteristics, the difference between homeworld and alienworld can be viewed as the difference in culture.

One question can be raised in this context: Is cultural difference to be surpassed? Husserl seems to be optimistic by introducing the idea of the one world (*die eine Welt*). According to Klaus Held's interpretation this "one world" is constituted in the same way as the intersubjectivity clarified in the *Cartesian Meditations V*. Just as the other subject (*alter ego*) is to be recognized through his body, especially through the similarity of his body and mine, so is the forerunner of the other cultural world recognizable through the basic human phenomena such as birth and death. The experience of Generativity (*Generativität*) creates so to speak the bridge between culture and culture.²

² Cf. Held 1991:323. Held stresses that the alienworld is that to which the homecomrades of a certain homeworld can not get access directly. Only through analogical association, in this case through urogenativity, is the alienworld to be reached. In this sense, the homeworld is constitutive of the alienworld. Anthony Steinbock understands Husserl differently in this point. He holds that homeworld and alienworld are co-constitutive. (Steinbock 1995:

Theoretically the relation between the one world and the different homeworlds is analogue to the identity pole (*Identitätspol*) of the intentional object and all its different perspectives (*Abschattungen*). Since the basis of the synthesis of the all the divergent perspectives lies in the identity pole of this object, so is the one world a "self" that functions among all different homeworlds. Besides, since the identity pole of an intentional object is an idea, which can be reached only by way of idealization, so is the one world also an idea.³

Historically, the world as an idea appeared first in the thought of the ancient Greece. The philosophy and science of that time provides the institution (*Urstiftung*) to pursue the one world as an idea. This idea has strongly influenced modern Europe and this one world has unfolded itself at least partly in the modern age of world history. Thereby almost all human beings thus encounter a new comprehensive homeworld, which affords a frame of universally accepted norms and values.⁴

Even though this "new world" is still in process, for Husserl its full development is desirable. Understood in this sense, the difference between cultures is something we as human beings should endeavor to surpass and, accordingly, it is obvious that the problem of cultural difference has not really been a matter of concern to Husserl. Routinely he speaks for the universal ground for all different lifeworlds.

179) I am not yet in a position to judge whether his interpretation is closer to Husserl than that of Held, But I find that his idea is similar to that of Waldenfels who speaks of "*Verschränkung von Heimwelt und Fremdwelt*". (Waldenfels 1993)

³ Hua XV: 181f.. In Held's interpretation, this one world remains a cultural homeworld in spite of its character of universality. It is one cultural world among many others. The consequence of this interpretation is that this universal world is both universal and concrete. This confusion of Husserl's theory of lifeworld is also comparable to that resulting from his definition of lifeworld both as ground and horizon. (Luhman 1986: 177; also see footnote1)

⁴ Hua XV: 139; also see Held 1991: 324. The implication of "Eurocentrism" as a consequence of this idea of one world will be discussed later.

II

In contrast to Husserl, Schutz integrates cultural difference as part of his lifeworld theory. The fact that he inherits the notion of lifeworld from Husserl does not mean that he has the same conception as Husserl from the beginning. Based on his concern to lay foundations for the social sciences, Schutz first conceives of the lifeworld as the world of praxis and sociality and then in his later writings due to his awareness of the significance of culture, he reformulates the lifeworld as the practical and social-cultural world. (Yu 1999) Since every lifeworld has its own particular culture, it follows that the lifeworlds are different from one another.

With help of the Husserlian concept "appresentation" Schutz constructs a theory of lifeworld that involves culture and cultural difference. (CP I; see also Yu 1996) Every experience in a lifeworld is for him based on the appresentational references; that is to say, people experience more than what they "purely experience." Let me clarify his viewpoint in a discussion between him and Aron Gurwitsch.

After finishing the draft of "Symbol, Reality and Society" (later published in 1952; see CP I), Schutz sent it to his close acquaintance Gurwitsch and received comments as follows:

[I]n various places you say that a 'thing' is transformed into a cultural object by appresentation. I am not so sure about that, although it is good Husserl... Behind all of these theories is Husserl's idea of a level of "pure experience" within the life-world, a level which is taken to be fundamental and on the basis of which other levels are built up. I have always had my doubts about this theory. If I take *social-cultural objects*, I understand how they can become "bodies" by means of unbuilding[Abbau] or some similar process; but I begin with bodies as the fundamental level, there are

difficulties in getting to the cultural objects. (Schutz/Gurwitsch 1989: 232)

Gurwitsch does not mention the way a thing (*ein Ding*) becomes a cultural object by means of appresentation. But one can see obviously to what he refers. They are examples like the place where Jacob dreams of God becoming God's house and an oven is more than just a fireplace, etc. (CP I: 337; 353) Gurwitsch wonders if such a conception of cultural objects might not remind us of that of Husserl? That is, does there exist at first the level of pure experience in the Lifeworld and then the *Aufbau* of the cultural object? In the eyes of Gurwitsch this is the way Husserl understands culture. For Husserl the pure experience in the Lifeworld is the perceptual experience of nature that is valid for all cultures. For example, the fact that marble is hard cannot be denied by whatever cultural interpretations. Such facts in perception are what Husserl calls the fundamental level of pure experience that is the ground of all different cultural experiences. Is the Schutzian conception of culture also to be understood in this way? Is there no difference between Schutz and Husserl, as Gurwitsch might suggest it?

Since Gurwitsch is in doubt about the validity of the Husserlian notion of culture, he has doubts about Schutz's notion too. For Gurwitsch the so-called fundamental level is not at all fundamental, rather it is the result of abstraction; only through *Abbau* from the cultural object might we see the grounding level. Schutz in his reply agrees with his colleague about this point. Nor will he accept the idea that there exists in the first place the pure experience and then the stage of culture. But he would not follow Gurwitsch when the latter tries to explain cultural phenomena with notions like *Aufbau* and *Abbau*. On the contrary he sees the crucial point in the *social conditions* within which a thing "becomes" a cultural object. With the examples of witchdoctors in the primitive societies and apparatus in the modern science he explains: "The contents

of the bag of a primitive witch doctor or a cyclotron is only considered to be a cultural object by the 'expert'."

(Schütz/Gurwitsch 1989: 237)

Whether a thing could be treated as a cultural object depends essentially on the social conditions. Only the members of the 'in-group' - be it a nation, a social level or just an interest-club - will be able to recognize the cultural meaning of something. They are the experts in this field, if we use "expert" in the broadest sense. Schutz says: "[E]ach of us has precise and distinct knowledge only about that particular field in which he is an expert. Among experts a certain technical knowledge is taken for granted, but exactly this technical knowledge is inaccessible to the layman." (CP I: 350) For the people who do not belong to this group these things have no cultural meaning at all. If they want to understand it, then they have no other way than just learning, especially by a process of acculturation.⁵

According to Schutz it is beyond question that every cultural object involves material components, and hence can be viewed as a "normal object." For example, is a holy stone not just a physical object, a church or a temple just a building? Yet a cultural object consists of something transcendent. The cultural elements of a cultural object seem to be just as natural as their physical components in the eyes of the "insider" of a social group. These components might seem bizarre in the eyes of the "outsider." The involved cultural meanings might be treated as relative, yet the relativity results only from the "outsider-viewpoint," that is, only if one refrains from recognizing these meanings as meanings. In contrast the "insiders" might treat their own value-system as absolute and anyone who does not or cannot share this system is seen to be a

stranger.⁶

The problem of pure experience that Gurwitsch mentions should be located in the context of the cultural difference between in-group and out-group from the angle of Schutz. That is, it is a problem of sociocultural reality. Because Gurwitsch does not catch this point, is he unable to understand Schutz appropriately. I believe that Schutz himself should be responsible for this misunderstanding since he has not explained his points clearly enough in "Symbol, Reality and Society." As a matter of fact the pure experience of lifeworld in the sense of Husserl is not at all impossible from Schutz's viewpoint. In the situation when people do not understand the cultural meaning of a thing, the pure experience of the lifeworld might turn up automatically. For example, a layman in art might wonder about what is expressed in an abstract painting and come to the conclusion that there appear nothing but certain lines, colors and shapes. The appresentational scheme on this occasion does not function at all. In addition, according to Schutz we have to get acquainted with the necessary background if we wish to become capable of appreciating the works of art; acculturation is apparently required.

To sum up, Schutz rejects the pure experience of the lifeworld that transgresses cultural difference, as Husserl addresses it. Every experience in the lifeworld is loaded with cultural significance and every social-cultural group is necessarily segregated from alien groups by forming its own cultural norms. Every lifeworld is accordingly different from others because of cultural difference.

But is Schutz exaggerating the difference between cultures? A careful reading reveals that he also speaks of some universal ideas almost in the tone of Husserl. He introduces the concept of "universal symbolism", which he describes as follows:

Everywhere we find sex groups and

⁵ Schutz says: "...I have to learn the typical distribution of knowledge prevailing in this group, and this involves knowledge of the appresentational, referential and interpretative schemes...which each of the subgroups takes for granted and applies to its respective appresentational reference."(CP I: 351)

⁶ Even the people who leave their homeland for all too long may also become stranger for the society in which they lived. (Cf. CP II: 106 f.)

age groups, and some division of labor conditioned by them; and more or less rigid kinship organizations that arrange the social world into zones of varying social distance, from intimate familiarity to strangeness. Everywhere we also find hierarchies of superordination and subordination, of leader and follower, of those in command and those in submission... There are everywhere, moreover, cultural objects, such as tools needed for the domination of the outer world, playthings for children, articles for adornment, musical instruments of some kind, objects serving as symbols for worship. (CP II: 229)

Evidently Schutz thinks that there exists universal cultural foundation in all human societies despite the cultural differences. This universal foundation is common to all sociocultural worlds because it is rooted in the human condition. (CP II: 229)

There is, so to speak, some confusion in Schutz's articulation between lifeworld and cultural difference, because, on the one hand, he speaks emphatically of the importance of cultural difference for the lifeworld, on the other he appeals to some cultural universals. My contention is that this confusion stems from the idea of grounding of which he is not quite aware. Consequently he shares with Husserl the thought that there exists an universal foundation for all cultures, though for Husserl this may be characterized as perception, whereas for Schutz it is cultural universals.

III

But why is the universal ground for all cultures necessary? Is this the inevitable consequence of the phenomenological inquiry, i.e., the search for eidetic essence? Waldenfels rejects this conception by questioning the legitimacy of the idea of grounding. He wonders how we can distinguish different orders as well as levels of meaning and compare them

without taking up a certain position? As he puts it:

*Selektive Ordnungen sind unvergleichbar in einem radikalen Sinne: es fehlt uns der Ort, von dem aus wir sie überblicken und aneinander messen können, und zwar deshalb, weil wir selbst in einer Ordnung leben.*⁷ (Waldenfels 1987: 164)

In face of other cultures the Europeans have not been conscious of their position taking and viewed the accomplishments from other cultures as stages of development reaching what the European have accomplished. Waldenfels characterizes this attitude as "Eurocentrism." (Waldenfels 1993: 61) But whence comes the "Eurocentrism"? With help of the Husserlian notions, which we also mentioned earlier, i.e., the notions of homeworld and alienworld Waldenfels tries to find an answer by posing the following question: How do the homeworld and the alienworld relate to each other? He explains that Husserl, on the one hand, recognizes the essential difference between homeworld and alienworld, but on the other he excludes this difference by introducing the idea of "one world for all." This world is common to homeworld and alienworld and gives all experiences the first ground (*erster Grund*) and the last horizon (*letzter Horizon*). The instrument for setting up this grounding level of meaning is reason (*Vernunft*). Europe is for Husserl a geographical name for reason itself, for a comprehensive form of rationality. Europe understands itself as "the guardian of the common world" (*Vorhut einer Gemeinwelt*) that is to be characterized by universality. The Europeans have created the standards and ideals for all cultures, which creation also manifests their right belief and right reason.

⁷ "Selective orders are incomparable in a radical sense: we are wanting in a position, from which we can glance over them and compare them, just because we ourselves live in a certain order." (my own translation)

(Waldenfels 1993: 61) Measured by this standard, all the accomplishments of other cultures can be seen to be the pre-logical, pre-rational or to put it directly, barbarian, pagan, or primitive. If their accomplishments are not to be eliminated in the history of reason (*Vernunftgeschichte*), the non-European could at least learn from the European and become European. (Hua VI: 320) To this Eurocentrism Waldenfels comments:

*Dieser Eurozentrismus bringt das Wunder fertig, mit dem Eigenen zu beginnen, durch das Fremde hindurchzugehen, um schließlich beim Ganzen zu enden.*⁸ (Waldenfels 1993: 61)

By such rational overcoming of otherness (*Fremdheit*) involved in the non-European cultures, the Europeans lose sight of otherness, and Waldenfels holds this blindness of otherness to be a considerable deficiency in European culture. He finds it questionable to treat the European order as the *only* order and suggests that the other cultures could construct their own standards and ideals and integrate the accomplishments of the European as part of their orders.⁹

IV

How is the rejection of the idea of grounding related to our topic? What could the new conception look like concerning the relationship between lifeworld and cultural difference without the idea of grounding?

Should we say that no lifeworld is universally valid for all cultures? Or instead, it is still meaningful to speak of universality in spite of differences between cultures? Waldenfels points out, the idea of universality is not at all undesirable as long

as we may assume the paradox of “universalization in plural”

(*Universalisierung im Plural*) (Waldenfels 1993: 63), according to which no culture could claim to have created *the* order.

Based on this understanding of universality, what is universal does not necessarily imply the idea of grounding. If universality is a result by universalization and without exception yielded in a certain culture, it cannot but remain contextual. If we see that every culture has its way of universalization and its idea of universality, there is no reason why this way of universalization should be rejected and its idea of universality be not recognized. By way of mutual recognition of universality we could avoid the naïve understanding that only they or we have created the *true* order of universalization.

In the age of globalization we seem to be marching toward a common world with universally accepted norms and values. But should globalization be realized at the price of cultural differences? If the globalization is desirable, should it be the result of conquering rather than mutual recognition and understanding? Should not different cultures learn from each other rather than impose their ideas on each other? These are questions that obviously deserve further investigations and reflections.

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⁸ “This Eurocentrism brings about wonder, beginning from the ownness, going through the otherness, and eventually ending in totality.” (my own translation)

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