NTU Studies in Language and Literature
Number 37 (June 2017), 1-22
DOI: 10.6153/NTUSLL.2017.37.01

Repetition and Apprenticeship in Orhan Pamuk's *The Black Book*

Pei-yun Chen
Associate Professor, Department of English
Tamkang University

Abstract

Written in the form of a quest novel with mysterious and paradoxical traits, *The Black Book* is widely categorized as "postmodern fiction." However, unlike most postmodern novels which thwart every attempt to search for meaning and self-knowledge, *The Black Book* does not dismiss the protagonist's detection as a total failure. In the search for his disappeared wife and cousin Celal, Galip, the protagonist, rereads the old columns and at the end of the story he retells the ancient tales. In his rereading and retelling of the story he becomes someone else, and in his becoming someone else he finds a way to be himself. Taking Gilles Deleuze's notions of repetition and apprenticeship, in this paper I argue that repetition in this story is not simply a postmodern device to confuse readers or to create illusionary effects, but a thread weaving Galip's apprenticeship, that is, a continuous process of learning. In Deleuze's sense, repetition must be understood in terms of relation, and *The Black Book* illustrates exactly how repetition signifies relations between individuals. In repeating Celal's every step, Galip transforms and changes himself, and each change actualizes a relation between the knowing subject and the known individual.

Keywords: *The Black Book*, Gilles Deleuze, difference and repetition, apprenticeship, double, becoming

奧罕・帕慕克《黑色之書》中的重複與學習之旅

陳佩筠
淡江大學英文學系副教授

摘 要

奧罕・帕慕克的《黑色之書》充滿神秘離奇又相互矛盾的特點，常被歸類爲後現代小說。然而不同於大部分後現代小說強調自我認識以及意義追尋終究是不可得的，本書主角的偵探之旅並非以全然失敗作結。書中主角蓋立普在整座伊斯坦堡四處尋找人間蒸發的妻子與堂兄時，重讀了堂兄席拉從前所寫的報紙專欄，並在故事最後不厭其煩地重述古老的故事。正是此重讀與重述故事的過程使他逐漸變成另一個人，也正是由於他的流變，他才能找到做他自己的可能性。本文援引德勒茲對於「重複」以及「學徒鍛鍊」等概念的論述提出以下論點：《黑色之書》中出現的這些「重複」（重讀、重述、重寫、雙生等）並非單純作爲後現代小說中用以擾亂讀者理性思緒或創造幻覺效果的寫作策略，而是一條看不見的線，串聯起一段蓋立普的學習之旅。德勒茲所論的「重複」必須從「關係」的角度理解之，而《黑色之書》具體展示出重複的重要意涵，亦即任何一次重複都必然包含不同個體之間的關係。在蓋立普對於席拉亦步亦趨的重複過程中，他自身也發生變化，而他每一個變化都實現了某種關係，也就是認識的主體與被認識的個體之間的關係。

關鍵詞：《黑色之書》、德勒茲、差異與重複、學徒鍛鍊、雙生、流變

Repetition and Apprenticeship in Orhan Pamuk's *The Black Book*

Pei-yun Chen

Orhan Pamuk, Turkish novelist and winner of the 2006 Nobel Prize in literature, has gained international recognition and successfully drawn the attention of a global readership to the Islamic world. His self-awareness of not being in the *center* of the world, which, as mentioned in his Nobel speech, has led him to question his authenticity. The awareness also corresponds to the recurrent themes in his works, such as "questions of identity, of modernity, of the differences between Islamic and European attitudes to art and culture" (Almond 76). *The Black Book*, one of Pamuk's most celebrated novels, tackles all these issues with a haunting question: "do you have difficulty being yourself?" (81, 156). However thorny the issue of identity crisis is, the plot of this novel is nevertheless simple. It can be thus briefly summarized: one day, a young lawyer Galip realized that his wife Rüya and his cousin Celal, a successful column writer, disappeared at the same time. Gradually, their perplexing disappearance haunted Galip. In order to find some clues, Galip re-read Celal's old columns and made every effort to decipher the secrets hidden in the columns. He set his foot on every street in Istanbul, eventually realizing that both the city and Celal's texts are full of signs: "they were all signs of a mystery" (188). In his painful investigation, Galip seemed to have "become" the other, Celal, his double, for he "knew for sure that he could become someone else through reading" (240). Hence the question "do you have difficulty being yourself" involves Galip's anguished search for his missing "dream" (Rüya), for an imperceptible other (Celal), and, above all, for the true meaning of "being oneself," which threatens to be a futile tautology: "[one] had discovered that the most important question in life was whether or not one could be oneself. His discovery was his entire life and his entire life was his discovery" (363).

Written in the form of a quest novel with mysterious and paradoxical traits,[1] *The Black Book* is widely categorized as postmodern fiction.[2] How-

[1] Linda Hutcheon in *A Poetics of Postmodernism* argues that "the basic defining feature of postmodernism in this study has been its paradoxical, not to say, contradictory nature" (201).

[2] Examples can be found in early studies in the English academia, notably Walter G. Andrews's "The

ever, unlike most postmodern fictions which thwart every attempt to search for meanings and prove that there is nothing but the abyss of meaninglessness, the protagonist in *The Black Book*, after experiencing this long journey of searching, enters the indiscernible zone in which Galip is both himself and the other. For him, "the only way to be oneself is by becoming another or by losing one's way in another's tales" (399). He eventually finds his way out in writing, since "nothing can be as astounding as life. Except for writing. Yes, of course, except for writing, the sole consolation" (400).

The recurring themes in *The Black Book*, such as the quest for meaning, the issue of writing, the playful narrative tricks, the coexistence of plural narrative voices, and the frustrated amateur detective (an anxious husband looking for his missing wife), all fit the traits of "metaphysical detective story,"[3] a text that

> parodies or subverts traditional detective-story conventions . . . with the intention, or at least the effect, of asking questions about mysteries of being and knowing which transcend the mere machinations of the mystery plot. (Merivale and Sweeney 2)

More often than not, the protagonist in such detective stories fails to solve the crime; instead, he "finds himself confronting the insoluble mysteries of his own interpretation and his own identity" (2). This apparent self-reflexive concern leads to the recurring themes of "to know thyself," of self-consciously questioning who one *really* is, and of doubling oneself and the other. With this concern of self-knowledge, however, "[s]ubjectivity presents a special problem for metaphysical sleuths," since "[d]etecting a singular identity is difficult in a postmodern world of forged papers and empty names" (10). The eventual failure of knowing oneself and detecting a singular identity characterizes *The Black Book* as a metaphysical detective story. As Almond indicates, "if *The Black Book* really is a detective novel, then it is the story of a failed detective, of a failed hermeneutics" (80). In effect, almost all detectives

---

Black Book and Black Boxes: Orhan Pamuk's *Kara Kitap*" (2000), and Ian Almond's "Islam, Melancholy, and Sad, Concrete Minarets: The Futility of Narratives in Orhan Pamuk's *The Black Book*" (2003).

[3] Bilge Mutluay Çetintaş frames *The Black Book* as metaphysical detective fiction by juxtaposing Pamuk and Paul Auster's widely celebrated *New York Trilogy* in the article "Defying Expectations: Paul Auster's *New York Trilogy* and Orhan Pamuk's *The Black Book* and *My Name is Red*" (2006).

in metaphysical detective stories fail and become victims in their impossible, futile detection.[4]

In some way, Galip indeed failed to solve the mystery and failed to find Celal and Rüya before they lost their lives; indeed, what happened between Celal and Rüya remained impalpable for Galip. However, if we emphasize Galip's failure and infer that every attempt to search for meanings will eventually turn to be futile, and if we recognize Pamuk's genius along with other postmodern predecessors, it seems that Pamuk is nothing more than a respectful follower of postmodern fictions without transcending other postmodernists' achievement. Recent study shows that categorizing *The Black Book* as a postmodern fiction may be insufficient, since such a reading ignores Pamuk's strong political intention intrinsic to the work. Two inspiring articles published in the same year (2012) manifest a sharp turn in which literary readings of *The Black Book* have been replaced by political ones, suggesting that Pamuk's works be read within the political context of Turkish modernization. In the essay "Secular Blasphemies: Orhan Pamuk and the Turkish Novel," Erdağ Göknar focuses on the significance of the political intention in Pamuk's works, arguing that "[t]he politics of Pamuk's novels emerges . . . from his literary interrogation of the so-called secularization thesis of modernity" (305). With his novels, Pamuk challenges the ideology of Turkish nationalism. Göknar considers novel writing as Pamuk's act to reconcile Turkish literary tradition with his cosmopolitan identity. In Göknar's reading, Pamuk's writing is bound to be his political manifesto, and therefore the thorny issue of identity can be better analyzed in terms of modern Turkish history. Üner Daglier shares with Göknar the same concern about the political context of Pamuk's writing, examining Pamuk's attitude towards the Turkish modernization project. Different from Göknar, though, Daglier argues that even though Pamuk's early writings demonstrate sober political sense, the writer "does not engage in a concrete attempt to vindicate [Turkey's traditional values and identity] or offer a viable political alternative to state-led westernization or secular modernity" (148). Although opinions on Pamuk's stance differ, these readings show a *political turn*, which emphasizes more political engagement of Pamuk's writing than its literary techniques. The prevalent political readings thus lead to scholars' concern on different transla-

[4] As Patricia Merivale and Susan Elizabeth Sweeney observe, "The detective's failure to identify individuals, interpret texts, or, even more to the point, solve mysteries, is characteristic of the metaphysical genre" (10).

tion versions of *The Black Book*. This may not be so surprising if we are aware of the fact that Göknar is one translator of Pamuk's works among others. In addition to mediating and negotiating between different linguistic systems, translators also serve as politico-cultural agents, since translators are more sensitive to the political and cultural context of the source texts than target readers.

Discussions on two translation versions of *The Black Book* therefore also illustrate a turn from literary reading to political concern. Sevinç Türkkan contends that *The Black Book* in Turkish and in its English translation demonstrate two different readings, "the original *Kara Kitap* emphasizes a specific Turkish context . . . while the translation . . . emphasizes the novel's intertextual references to Western literary narratives" (45). In short, the difference between the original and the translated texts lies more on the messages chosen to be distinguished than on linguistic structures. Although the first English translator of *The Black Book*, Güneli Gün, has been severely criticized, Türkkan reminds readers of the fact that Gün is both a translator and a creative writer, hence claiming,

> In line with her affinity for postmodern literary devices and ransacking archival material, Gün translates *The Black Book* by emphasizing its intertextual and metatextual aspects, thereby attracting attention to the mediated nature of the act of writing and rewriting. (44)

Postmodern literary devices are the key to bringing Pamuk to a cosmopolitan writer who appeals to a global readership through translation. However, ever since the rise of the *cultural turn* in translation studies, readers of translated texts are aware that translation is not simply transporting meanings between different languages; the "constraints, or manipulative processes involved in the transfer of texts" must be taken into consideration in the analysis (Bassnett 123).[5] Holding this point of view, Karim Matter criticizes that framing Pamuk as a cosmopolitan writer in effect "obscure[s] the depth of his engagement with the local and the national" (45); reading Pamuk in light of postmodernism also obscures "not only [*The Black Book*'s] rich and nuanced engagement with Turkish History, but also the real political contexts of its

[5] This is the main argument that Susan Bassnett presents in the essay "The Translation Turn in Cultural Studies." See pages 123-24.

Turkish reception" (53). Since postmodernism is relatively familiar for Western readers, Matter indicates what is at stake to put Pamuk into a reader-oriented literary framework, that is, postmodernism. For Matter, neglecting Pamuk's political engagement with Turkey is in effect to domesticate the text for facilitating and comforting a Western readership.

With a brief review of the recent discussions on *The Black Book*, I intend to manifest that nowadays the political readings of the text seem to outweigh the literary ones. Contextualizing the novel in the history of Turkish modernization certainly helps reveal Pamuk's political engagement, which complicates the issue of identity in the novel and therefore enriches the possibility of reading. While both postmodern and political reading of the novel make great contributions, I think that readers may also be inspired by Pamuk's sincere reflections upon his own writing experience that he states in *The Naïve and the Sentimental Novelist*, in which we can sense that for Pamuk, the art of the novel remains the kernel in his writing.[6] Pamuk asserts that novel is distinguished from other narrative because it has "a secret center" (*NSN* 25). As Pamuk explains, the center of the novel is "a profound opinion or insight about life, a deeply embedded point of mystery, whether real or imagined" (153). But the center does not remain stable throughout the whole novel; the opposite is true, the center changes while "many things remained the same in the novel" (158). The secret center of the novel seems ambiguous and inscrutable, which constitutes the novel and puts together everything in the novel. In the following, I intend to show that the center of *The Black Book* is precisely "difference," and precisely for this reason Galip's frustrated journey does not aim at his problematic identity. Instead, it is difference that he is looking for by virtue of gaining "a sense of the profound, essential *knowledge* of what it means to exist in this world, and the nature of that sense" (28; emphasis added). To approach the center of the novel, the protagonist begins a journey of knowing, his "apprenticeship." But how does his apprenticeship work? To what end? What activates him?

Although Galip's detection seems to fail at the first glance, we shall not forget that at the end of the story, he "embrace[s] with increasing ardor [his] newly found work which is nothing more than *retelling* these old, very old—ancient—tales" (399-400; emphasis added). This provides a crucial hint for readers: instead of falling into a desperate abyss, Galip enthusiastically

---

[6] Pamuk shares his idea of creative writing as well as his life experience in *The Naïve and the Sentimental Novelist* (2011), hereafter abbreviated as *NSN*.

"retells" the old tales. Moreover, Galip looks for his missing wife and cousin by "rereading" the old columns. Although it may sound contradictory, precisely in his rereading and retelling of the story he becomes someone else, and precisely in his becoming someone else he finds a way to be himself. The uncanny effects that Galip experiences in repeating Celal's life are also constitutive in the process. However, it must be noted that Galip's repeating Celal's life does not refer to repetition of the same, but repetition of the different. Bare repetition never leads one to *become* someone else or oneself. Hence repetition in this story is not simply a postmodern device to confuse readers or create illusionary effects, but a thread weaving Galip's journey of self-knowledge, a journey that designates his subjectivation. Although it is without doubt that *The Black Book* is a *Bildungsroman*, what remains obscure is how the process in which the protagonist acquires the knowledge of the world works, why repetition is indispensible, and exactly why one becomes both himself and the other by repeating the other's life.

The notion of "the double" is one of the common devices in postmodern fictions applied to illustrate the illusory effects of repetition, so it is not surprising that the double is usually related to Galip's imitating Celal's life and column writing. Such analyses take the double as either similar or identical to the subject. However, in the following, I take Gilles Deleuze's inspiring conceptions of difference and repetition to argue that the double is by far someone similar or a reflection of oneself, but on the contrary, the double belongs to the structure of the other and it signifies difference. Galip's repeating Celal's life, rereading his columns, and retelling the tales is a way of *knowing*—not knowing something/someone already there, but considering knowing as actualizing a relation between oneself and the other. It is palpable that *The Black Book* presents the protagonist as a "processual subject," the formation of which is never a result determined by the national and cultural identity, but an ongoing process of subjectivation. Different from subjectivity, which ignores the process of formation and constant modification, subjectivation must be understood as "the relation to oneself," as Deleuze contends: it "continues to create itself, but by transforming itself and changing its nature" (*Foucault* 104). As can be seen in *The Black Book*, repetition is a term signifying "relations"; in other words, whenever repetition occurs, there appears a certain relation between coexistent series (be it person, object, event, etc.). In the case of *The Black Book*, Galip's repeating Celal's life signifies the relation of Galip and Celal, his relation to Rüya, and the relation to himself. In repeating Celal's every step, Galip transforms and changes himself, and each

change actualizes a relation between the knowing subject (Galip) and the known individual (Celal).

I. Detection and Apprenticeship

How does "detection" begin? The unfolding of detective stories is commonly involved with a mystery, which casts puzzles for readers. The "puzzle element" is common in mystery detective stories, which refer to "the presentation of the mystery as an ongoing problem for the reader to solve" (Rzepka 10). The prototype of the classic detective, Edgar Allan Poe's C. Auguste Dupin, perfectly embodies the logic of classic detective story—the detective identifies himself with the criminal. In this logic, however, there is still a clear distinction between the detective and the criminal. In Poe's most celebrated detective story "The Purloined Letter," for example, Dupin's method of detection is to

> use his powers of "analysis" . . . to read the Minister's mind and determine how best to "purloin" it himself. Apparently, Dupin must first walk the path of induction to its dead end, or watch others do so, before he can begin to imagine what might lie beyond. (Rzepka 75)

With this method, the detective enters the criminal mind and imagines how the criminal may act. In this case, the detective's identifying himself with the criminal does not mean that they eventually become one; instead, it signifies a repetition of the crime experience. It is therefore curious how it is even possible to establish a so-called identity of the two since the detective and the criminal are never identical. How can one be identical to the other?

In one way or another, metaphysical detective stories respond to these questions. The confusing and mysterious atmosphere in metaphysical detective stories is created by the ambiguous nature of the investigation, that is, the "detective's search for another is a definitively unsuccessful search for himself: he is the principal missing person for whom the reader, too, is forced to search" (Merivale and Sweeney 10). The relationship between the observer and the observed, between the detective and the missing person, cannot be understood as that of the subject and the object. The ultimate aim of the search turns out to be the detective himself. When the observer and the observed are undistinguishable, one truly becomes the other; or, to put it in a

more careful way, one becomes one. The relationship between the two is no longer *A becomes B*, but rather, *A becomes A*. This type of stories usually implies a great theme of self-knowledge (*connaissance*). The act "to know" constitutes the fundamental thrust of almost all detective stories, but what exactly is the object of such knowledge? In metaphysical detective stories, if the ultimate object of the detective's self-knowledge is *himself*, and yet what appears unknown and inscrutable is precisely *himself*, how and what does the detective eventually know? As is often the case, the observer in metaphysical detective stories fails or becomes the victim in his own investigation. This may imply a cruel fact that there is no solution to the investigation of self-knowledge.

It is at this point that Deleuze's notion of apprenticeship may shed new light on the futile postmodern detection. In *The Black Book*, Galip the observer does not simply repeat or imitate what Celal did. What he does can be understood as a process of learning, namely, "apprenticeship" in Deleuze's term. Learning is "the appropriate name for the subjective acts carried out when one is confronted with the objecticity of a problem" (*DR* 164).[7] An apprentice is "someone who constitutes and occupies practical or speculative problems as such" (164). The apprentice becomes sensitive to signs which cause problems and then figures out what the problem is. The problem is not always already there, or completely determined from the very beginning. Apprenticeship begins with someone who fortuitously encounters with signs which signal problems and force us to think. Thinking, Deleuze argues, is not a subjective spontaneous act out of a natural love for the truth; instead, we think because of our encounter with something that forces us to think and to seek the truth. "Everything that teaches us something emits signs; every act of learning is an interpretation of signs or hieroglyphs" (*PS* 4). The apprentice is forced to go through a paradoxical period during which the apprentice does not yet possess the knowledge or the truth of a solution. The only thing he does know is there exists something that he is forced to know. During this paradoxical period, we then can see

> how truth and falsity are distributed according to what one understands of a problem; and how the final truth, when it is obtained,

[7] Deleuze concerns the notion of apprenticeship in *Difference and Repetition* (hereafter abbreviated as *DR*) and *Proust and Signs* (*PS*).

> emerges as though it were the limit of a problem completely determined and entirely understood. . . . (*DR* 165)

In this sense, since the apprentice enters a field where he is forced to think, to know what the problem is caused, and to interpret the signs whose nature is unknown, learning is then understood as "the intermediary between non-knowledge and knowledge, the living passage from one to the other" (166). This is the proper sense of "becoming"—always in-between, in the passage. Learning, in this sense, has nothing to do with imitation; learning signifies the in-betweenness of a sign and a response. It constitutes a "space of an encounter with signs," which involves difference, that is, the Other (23).

II. Virtual Object and Repetition

In *The Black Book*, Galip is thrown into a seemingly unsolvable mystery: he went home as usual and found the nineteen-word farewell letter Rüya left him. With her silent disappearance, a "sign," Galip is forced to begin his apprenticeship. At the beginning, Galip went through every drawer in his apartment and got to the bottoms of boxes in the hope of finding any hint about her disappearance, but soon conceded "how aimless his efforts were," placing "whatever he had in his hand meticulously back into its original place" (45). He begins his search, but he does not yet know what to search for. A problem is caused, but he does not yet know what the problem is, and hence does not yet know how to obtain the knowledge about this problem.

In a fashion similar to Jacques Lacan's analysis of Edgar Allan Poe's purloined letter, we may read Rüya's disappearance as a displacement from her usual place. But this sense of displacement is understood by virtue of the reality principle; which means, "the real objects are subjected to the law of being *or* not being somewhere," as Deleuze states (*DR* 102; emphasis in original). The idea of "virtual objects" explains how two real series, separated by time—one happening in the former present and the other in the current present—can coexist as what we understand to be "repetition." Virtual objects circulate and make two series communicate with each other. Although it may seem that the later series repeats the former one as these two series signify two successive presents, Deleuze argues that they actually form

> *two real series which coexist in relation to a virtual object of another kind*, one which constantly circulates and is displaced in

> them. . . . Repetition is constituted not from one present to another, but between the two coexistent series that these presents form in function of the virtual object (object = *x*). (104-05; emphasis in original)

In short, virtual object is what makes repetition possible.

The letter in Poe's story perfectly illustrates what the virtual object is—it is always displaced, and yet the letter is what causes repetition. In his reading of Poe's "The Purloined Letter," Lacan uses the term "pure signifier" to refer to the letter (32). It is what determines the place (and the displacement) of subjects during the intersubjective repetition. To clarify the structure of the drama (the story), Lacan mentions two scenes and three glances. The first scene is in the Queen's chamber, where she is trying to hide the letter from her royal spouse. The letter is later stolen by Minister D—, who sees through the Queen's secret and substitutes a counterfeit letter with hers. The second scene follows the same pattern as the first one. Now in the Minister's hotel, the detective Dupin, like what the Minister has done in the primal scene, stole the letter and substituted it with another one. With these two scenes, Lacan observes three glances, which are "borne by three subjects, incarnated each time by different characters" (32). They are clearly illustrated as follows:

> The first is a glance that sees nothing: the King and the police.
>
> The second, a glance which sees that the first sees nothing and deludes itself as to the secrecy of what it hides: the Queen, and the Minister.
>
> The third sees that the first two glances leave what should be hidden exposed to whoever would seize it: the Minister, and finally Dupin. (32)

The aim of Lacan's categorization is to manifest the intersubjective modulus in Freud's repetition automatism. Simply put, Lacan reads the story in light of the characters' repetitive actions; some actions are repeated (such as hiding, stealing, and substituting the letter), but each time the same actions are repeated by different characters. With the scene being repeated, subjects change their position. The Minister, for example, takes the position of the third glance in the primal scene, and moves to the second position in the second scene. The position of the subject is changed with the circulation of the letter. The letter, being a pure signifier, sustains itself only in displacement. This is

how Lacan interprets repetition automatism: "the displacement of the signifier determines the subjects in their acts . . . without regard for character or sex" (43-44). In such an interpretation, repetition happens and can be observed in real actions, even though Lacan claims that the subjects (and their actions) are constituted by the symbolic order.

Deleuze, while recognizing Lacan's insights, maintains that the whole concept of psychoanalysis understands repetition as only operating in the real series, from one present to a former present. In other words, "[t]he traditional theory of the compulsion to repeat in psychoanalysis remains essentially *realist, materialist and subjective*" (*DR* 104; emphasis added). But conceptualizing repetition in the real, material series would be difficult since any repetition constituted by successive presents can never find a way for two series to coexist; the two series must be mutually exclusive, for only one series can occupy the present. Either it is this one, or the other. In this way, "how can the former present act at a distance upon the present one?" (104). How can we know the present is the repetition of the former present?

Virtual objects, unlike real objects which are either being or not being somewhere, "exist only as fragments of themselves: they are found only as lost; they exist only as recovered" (*DR* 102). With this idea of repetition, it should be noted that the name Rüya is connected to dream. With "Rüya" being the Turkish synonym of "dream," whenever Galip recalled their childhood or marriage, she was described as dream-like. Everything about her, including the most trivial daily life, appeared impenetrable for Galip. He knew well that "the garden in this clandestine world that swarmed with uncanny plants and terrifying flowers was closed to him totally" (Pamuk, *Black Book* 47). While she was living with Galip, reading her favorite detective novels, she was there and yet not there. Rüya, his dream, whether she is physically there with him or not, is always displaced. With the virtual object circulating, that is, the dream-like Rüya, two series, Galip and Celal, coexist in relation to her. Repetition, Deleuze argues, "depends upon the virtual object as an immanent instance which operates above all by displacement" (*DR* 105; emphasis in original). The displacement of the virtual object activates repetition, but such a repetition refers to two heterogeneous series, Galip and Celal, that resonate with each other.

III. The Detective and Who He Becomes

Ever since Rüya left, Celal's old columns have been published in the newspaper once again—it suggests that Celal "hadn't offered any new col-

umns to his editors in quite a while, as well as the hidden signal for something totally different" (81). In order to seek the answer to this puzzling circumstance, Galip found himself beginning to write. In writing, however clumsy he may be, Galip "felt as if he was approaching the entrance of a door that was suggestive of Rüya, a new world, and the new person he wanted to become" (92). Galip soon turned his object of search from Rüya to Celal, who, for Galip, is no less mysterious and incomprehensible than Rüya. Unlike dream-like Rüya who seems unreachable, Celal's impenetrability for Galip is perhaps rooted in their ambiguous distance from each other. Galip loved Celal and yet "wanted to get away from him; he was looking for him and yet he wanted to put him out of his mind" (106). For Galip, Celal kept the secret about the mystery of the parallel universe from him at that time; he believed that Celal was the reason why he could never be himself.

The leitmotif of "doubleness" is recurring in postmodern fiction. In *The Black Book*, the "doubleness," as Andrews observes, also has to do with "the problem [and perhaps impossibility] of 'being oneself'" (126). The theme of doubleness in this book therefore refers to Galip's relation to Celal as well as the collective anxiety across the whole country. While conventional reading would relate doubleness to the question of identity and the Turkish struggle with secularization, modernization, and Westernization,[8] Andrews, in contrast, argues that doubleness designates a "*both/and*" schema without synthesizing two opposites (126; emphasis in original). He then insightfully points out that doubleness in strong authors, such as Pamuk, "lies precisely in their ability to be both 'themselves' and 'something/one else,' to be uncontained by the boundaries of single 'nations' or 'selves'" (127-28). Understood in this fashion, Galip's repeating Celal does not mean that Galip is becoming another man. One does not become another by repetition. Instead, one becomes both one and someone else: one and the other become indiscernible. Galip becomes himself not by searching for Celal as a projection of his own inner mind, as a mirror of himself, but by interiorizing his double. The identification of the seeker and the sought, understood in terms of the logic of identity, fails to answer the question how one can be another. As Rumi asks: "If I am He, then why am I still searching?" (Pamuk, *Black Book* 227). The seeker, the apprentice, even when he comes to realize what he is searching for is pre-

[8] Some eminent examples include: Almond's "Islam, Melancholy, and Sad, Concrete Minarets"; Göknar's "Secular Blasphemies"; Daglier's "Orhan Pamuk on the Turkish Modernization Project"; and Matter's "Orhan Pamuk and the Limits of Translation."

cisely his double, cannot stop his search at the point where he knows exactly what his object is. Hence it is important for the apprentice to recognize that "it is not finding that is essential but *keeping on the path*" (227; emphasis added).

It may be generally agreed that Galip's search represents the formation of subjectivity. But such a convenient reading in effect reduces the process of investigation to his personal history as a journey describing his personal identity crisis, his individual frustration at the moment when his seemingly perfect life collapses. But Galip does not aim at becoming Celal. As readers learn, in the end of the book Galip states,

> I end up recalling some other story in which the only way to be oneself is by becoming another or by losing one's way in another's tales; and the tales I want to put together in the black book remind me of a third or fourth tale, just like our love stories and memory gardens that open into one another. . . . (399)

His personal memory opens into another's tales to the point where "the gates of [his] own personality open and close as [he] was being transformed into another person" (397). In short, he is becoming anyone and no one. He is becoming not the specific Galip, but "a depersonalized man" who is more like a node, open to make connections to anyone else.

Galip's transformation in the process of searching for his missing wife and cousin does not simply refer to a kind of self-knowledge but individuation, because individuality is not equal to the Self. If self-knowledge is possible, there must exist an other within the Self. As Deleuze argues, "Individuality is not a characteristic of the Self but, on the contrary, forms and sustains the system of the dissolved Self" (*DR* 254). The dissolved Self refers to the Self that "includes in its essence a receptivity of intuition in relation to which *I* is already an other" (58; emphasis in original). Deleuze maintains the dissolved Self in the context of his critique on the Cartesian Cogito. How can a subject contemplate itself, if it is not that the Self is also already an other? For, once the subject thinks itself, it ceases to be a subject; it is the object of its contemplation. The dissolved Self is termed to specify the relationship between subject and what the subject thinks himself. As Sarah Gendron puts it, "In order to reflect upon the self, the self must mutate into something other than it is" (49). An individual is never an indivisible unity and hence constitutes an identity; on the contrary, individual is "never ceasing to divide and

change its nature" (*DR* 257). Because individuating factors ceaselessly communicate with each other, individuation happens in enveloping and being enveloped (or, in folding and unfolding). Deleuze refutes the Cartesian Cogito in which the I and the Self explicate each other. The psychic systems have to be thought in terms of individuation instead of the I and the Self, because the I "is inseparable from a form of identity, while the Self is indistinguishable from a matter constituted by a continuity of resemblances" (257). Identity and resemblances exclude difference and becoming. Individuation never refers to an identity; its nature is "mobile, strangely supple, fortuitous and endowed with fringes and margins" (257). Instead of replacing subjectivity by individuation, Deleuze uses the terms "dissolved Self" and "fractured I" to designate the structure of "the other." But this structure of the other "refers only to the self for the other I and the other I for the self" (260). This understanding of "other" corresponds to the notion of "double," but "it is never the other who is a double in the doubling process, it is a self that lives me as the double of the other" (Deleuze, *Foucault* 98). To be more specific, it is a dissolved Self, a fractured I that lives me as the double of the other. That is to say, the Self, the I, being dissolved and fractured, interiorizes the other, its double. The interiorization of the other signifies a process during which the individual envelopes and is simultaneously being enveloped by other individuating factors, whereby the matter of the Self and the form of the I are disrupted.

This notion of double, which has to do with the other, is understood in a different light from what is conventionally thought. "Double" in this context is involved with the intensive nature of individuation. Conventional understanding of double is based on extension because it is the distinction between the subject and the object that sustain the double. This very distinction makes the other external to oneself, and one's relation to the other is confined to the oscillation between subject and object. To state that the I and the Self lives in me as the double of the other is not a redundant, confusing statement; it indicates a ceaseless enveloping and enveloped process, that is, individuation. Hence the individual is not in-divisible as it is traditionally assumed; it never "ceas[es] to divide and change its nature" by implicating, and meanwhile being implicated, individual factors and differential relations (*DR* 257). The significance of the double is not to provide a mirror, a reflection of oneself, or to assume the status of the subject. The significance is based on its expressive value. Something is expressed by the other, and this expression is never divorced from its expressor, the other. Therefore, whenever we see one's face, we simultaneously see a possible world expressed by this face. To grasp the

other as such, we must "multiply one's own world by populating it with all those expresseds that do not exist apart from their expressions" (261). This is the proper sense of individuation, which is not extensive but intensive; it is a ceaseless interiorization of difference.

IV. Repetition of the Different

In contemporary thought, subjectivity is commonly put in question. In effect, claiming the subject as ceaselessly becoming hardly brings up anything new. But the indistinguishable relation of the self and the other still deserves careful examination. A few sentences towards the very end of *The Black Book* read:

> Then toward morning *he* aches remembering Rüya and gets up from the desk to gaze at the city sleeping in darkness. *I* remember Rüya and, getting up from the desk, I gaze at the city's darkness. *We* remember Rüya and gaze at Istanbul's darkness. (400; emphasis added)

Three seemingly identical sentences are repeated with different personal pronouns. This ending sentence includes many factors that are relevant to Galip's processual subjectivation: his relation to the always displaced virtual object (Rüya) and to his double (Celal). The repetition of these three sentences, nevertheless, illustrates *repetition of the different*. Repetition "must be understood in the pronominal" because "there is no repetition without a repeater" (*DR* 23). Different pronouns refer to different repeaters, but these repeaters do not simply mean particular individuals. In the repetition of these ending sentences, different repeaters (pronouns) are becoming so as to *become indiscernible*. Each repetition brings up something different because difference is internal to repetition.

Repetition of the different constitutes the center of *The Black Book*. The form of the detective novel requires the characters to bear given names, and hence readers may be easily misled to believe this is the protagonist's long journey of self-knowledge. The novel, however, is not only a story about Galip's anguished detection of the mystery. The multiple narrative perspectives employed in the novel prove that it is in one's (Galip's) repeating the other (Celal) that they become indiscernible. Here we observe two kinds of repetition. Indeed, Celal's columns are reprinted on newspaper, and Galip

intends to look for him by repeating every step of his life. In this kind of repetition, there is a referent, considered as the model for repetition, so people can judge what is being repeated. Identical repetition, or repetition of the Same, brings nothing different. There is still a second repetition which includes difference, namely, repetition of the different. The second repetition is dynamic, intensive, and evolving. These two repetitions coexist; repetition of the Same is "only the external envelop, the abstract effect" while repetition of the different is "the interiority and the heart . . . the depths" of the first repetition (*DR* 24). Recognizing these two kinds of repetition is crucial for our understanding of how one can become by virtue of repetition, and why repetition of the Same remains necessary even though it brings nothing new. Bare repetition appears as the external effect, but it is only the disguise of another kind of repetition, a repetition of the different.

Encountered with the sign, that is, Rüya and Celal's disappearance, Galip is set to be involved in an apprenticeship. The first step he takes is to imitate Celal and gradually become similar to him physically and psychologically. Such resemblance, however, is only a disguise of something that is moving and changing. But one does not learn by doing *like* others; one learns by doing *with* others, and learns from someone who emits signs which are themselves heterogeneous and evolving. It is never sufficient for Galip to write and act *like* Celal; the most important lesson in his apprenticeship is his becoming, becoming someone else *and* himself—"[T]o be is to be someone else. I am someone else; therefore I am" (339). The true paradox in this sentence, however, does not lie in being *both* oneself and someone else. Pamuk puts the true paradox in question:

> What you call "mystery" was your knowing it without understanding it, writing the truth without getting it. No one could ever discover this truth without first *being* at one with himself. If he does discover it, then it also means that he hasn't managed to *become* himself. (337; emphasis added)

The paradox, then, is that of being and becoming. If one *is* truly oneself, one does not become. If one becomes, one can never *be* oneself. At the first glance, we may infer that Galip's long journey represents a failure—he can neither be Celal nor can he recognize himself: "I was so far from being myself that I was becoming a stranger to this black book, as well as to Galip" (396). But the writer does not emphasize this failure, even though readers

learn towards the end of the story that Galip is not able to find Celal and Rüya when they are still alive. The story continues, and it continues in a way that Galip tells and retells stories; in a way that he grasps the possibility to connect to others. In his words:

> I . . . [wait] for the things around me to gradually get transformed into things from another world, signs from another universe. It was then that I sensed somewhere deep in my memory a recollection stir like a shadow, and as the shadow advanced through a gate in the garden of remembrance that opened into another garden, only to continue through a second and then a third and fourth gate, I felt all through this familiar process the gates of my own personality open and close as I was being transformed into another person who could become involved and happy with that shadow. . . . (397)

The story does not have a definite end, and so does one's becoming. If we focus the story on the process in which its protagonist goes through, we may say this story is an illustration of Galip's subjectivation, not subjectivity. From a broader scope, we may turn our attention from a particular person's story onto individuation. Individuation has to do with fractured I and dissolved Self, which both constitute the structure of the other. Fractured I and dissolved Self indicate the otherness intrinsic to individuation—in other words, individuation is the process of becoming, the constant interiorization of the other, the different. As is commonly known, the notion of double is a recurring theme in metaphysical detective stories. It seems to suggest that the existence of the other is indispensible for self-knowledge; the double usually functions as a reflection of the protagonist's state of mind. Nevertheless, the notion of double is far more sophisticated in Pamuk's writing. The double is not a mirror, but one's interiorizing the other within oneself. If the double is a mirror, there is an irreducible distance and distinction between the mirror (object) and oneself (subject); one can never become the other. Pamuk, on the other hand, shows the expressive value of Galip's double, Celal. The proper name does not merely refer to a certain character, but to a possible world expressed by everything about Celal. Whenever Galip tries to explicate Celal's mystery, he actually multiplies and populates his own world with whatever Celal expresses.

"Nothing can be as astounding as life," and perhaps so is one's becoming oneself (Pamuk, *Black Book* 400). If self-knowledge remains a great

theme for contemporary philosophy and literature, probably that is because it is a journey without end, a problem without solution, and a mystery without definite explanation. But with the form of a novel Pamuk explores this endless passage, so we may see, if we are attentive enough, the other, the different, or the possible worlds within each of us.

Works Cited

Almond, Ian. "Islam, Melancholy, and Sad, Concrete Minarets: The Futility of Narratives in Orhan Pamuk's *The Black Book*." *New Literary History* 34.1 (2003): 75-90. Print. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/nlh.2003.0002]

Andrews, Walter G. "The Black Book and Black Boxes: Orhan Pamuk's *Kara Kitap*." *Edebiyat* 11 (2000): 105-29. Print.

Bassnett, Susan. "The Translation Turn in Cultural Studies." *Constructing Cultures: Essays on Literary Translation*. Ed. Susan Bassnett and André Lefevere. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters, 1998. 123-40. Print.

Çetintaş, Bilge Mutluay. "Defying Expectations: Paul Auster's *New York Trilogy* and Orhan Pamul's *The Black Book* and *My Name Is Red*." *Journal of Arts and Sciences* 6 (2006): 51-61. Print.

Daglier, Üner. "Orhan Pamuk on the Turkish Modernization Project: Is It a Farewell to the West?" *Humanitas* 25.1-2 (2012): 146-67. Print.

Deleuze, Gilles. *Difference and Repetition*. Trans. Paul Patton. New York: Columbia UP, 1994. Print.

---. *Foucault*. Ed. and trans. Seán Hand. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1988. Print.

---. *Proust and Signs: The Complete Text*. Trans. Richard Howard. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2000. Print.

Gendron, Sarah. "'A Cogito for the Dissolved Self': Writing, Presence, and the Subject in the Work of Samuel Beckett, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze." *Journal of Modern Literature* 28.1 (2004): 47-64. Print. [http://dx.doi.org/10.2979/JML.2004.28.1.47]

Göknar, Erdağ. "Secular Blasphemies: Orhan Pamuk and the Turkish Novel." *Novel: A Forum on Fiction* 45.2 (2012): 301-26. Print. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/ 00295132-1573985]

Hutcheon, Linda. *A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction*. New York: Routledge, 1988. Print. [http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203358856]

Lacan, Jacques. "Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter'." Trans. Jeffery Mehlman. *The Purloined Poe: Lacan, Derrida, and Psychoanalytic Reading*. Ed. Jonh P. Muller and William J. Richardson. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1988. 28-54. Print.

Matter, Karim. "Orhan Pamuk and the Limits of Translation: Foreignizing *The Black Book* for World Literature." *Translation & Literature* 23.1 (2014): 42-67. Print. [http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/tal.2014.0135]

Merivale, Patricia and Susan Elizabeth Sweeney. "The Game's Afoot: On the Trail of the Metaphysical Detective Story." *Detecting Texts: The Metaphysical Detective Story from Poe to Postmodernism*. Ed. Patricia Merivale and Susan Elizabeth Sweeney. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1999. 1-24. Print. [http://dx.doi.org/10.9783/9780812205459.1]

Pamuk, Orhan. *The Black Book.* Trans. Güneli Gün. New York: Harvest, 1994. Print.

---. *The Naïve and the Sentimental Novelist—Understanding What Happens When We Write and Read Novels.* Trans. Nazım Dikbaş. New York: Vintage, 2011. Print.

Rzepka, Charles J. *Detective Fiction*. Cambridge: Polity, 2005. Print.

Türkkan, Servinç. "Orhan Pamuk's *Kara Kitap*: (British) Reception vs. (American) Translation." *Making Connections* 11.2 (2010): 39-58. Print.

[Received 17 March 2017;
accepted 15 May 2017]